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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model to study how entrepreneurs and venture-capital investors deal with
moral hazard, effort provision, asymmetric information and hold-up problems. We explore several
financing scenarios, including first-best, monopolistic, syndicated and fully competitive financing.
We solve numerically for the entrepreneur's effort, the terms of financing, the venture capitalist's
investment decision and NPV. We find significant value losses due to holdup problems and under-
provision of effort that can outweigh the benefits of staged financing and investment. We show that
a commitment to later-stage syndicate financing increases effort and NPV and preserves the option
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This paper develops a model to study how entrepreneurs and venture-capital investors deal
with eﬀort provision, moral hazard, asymmetric information and hold-up problems when
contracts are incomplete and investment proceeds in stages. How much value is lost in the
entrepreneur-venture capital relationship relative to ﬁrst-best value? How does the value
lost depend on risk and the time-pattern of required investment? What determines whether
a positive-NPV project can in fact be ﬁnanced? What are the advantages and disadvantages
of staged ﬁnancing? Are there signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains from syndication of later-stage
ﬁnancing?
We argue that these and related questions should not be analyzed one by one, but
jointly in a common setting. Some features of venture-capital contracting may not solve a
particular problem, but instead trade oﬀ one problem against another. For example, a study
that focused just on the option-like advantages of staged investment could easily miss the
costs of staging, particularly the negative feedback to eﬀort if venture-capital investors can
hold up the entrepreneur by dictating ﬁnancing terms in later stages. (We ﬁnd many cases
where hold-up costs outweigh the advantages of staged ﬁnancing and full upfront ﬁnancing
actually increases value.)
A joint analysis of the problems inherent in the entrepreneur-venture capital relationship
does not lead to closed-form solutions or simple theorems. Therefore we embark on an
experiment in computational corporate ﬁnance, which is the formal study of ﬁnancing and
investment problems that do not have closed-form solutions.1 We believe the time is ripe
for a computational model of venture capital. Venture-capital institutions, contracts and
procedures were well documented more than a decade ago. It was clear then that the agency
and information problems encountered in ordinary ﬁnancing decisions are especially acute
in venture capital. The successes of venture capital have stimulated theoretical work on how
these problems are mitigated. But most theoretical papers have focused on only one problem
or tradeoﬀ and run the risk of missing the bigger picture.
Of course the breadth and richness of a computational model do not come free, and
numerical results are never absolutely conclusive. One can never rule out the possibility
that results would have been diﬀerent with diﬀerent inputs or modeling choices. But our
model, though simpliﬁed, follows actual practice in venture capital. We have veriﬁed our
main results over a wide range of inputs. We believe our results help to clarify why venture-
capital investment works when it works and why it sometimes fails.
The structure of venture-capital ﬁnancing is known from many sources, including Sahlman
(1990), Lerner (1994), Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995), Gompers (1995), Gompers and Lerner
(1996, 2002), Hellman and Puri (2000, 2002) and Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2003). We will
preview our model and results after a brief review of the features of venture-capital con-
tracting that are most important to our paper. The review includes comments on related
1Computational models are frequently used to understand the value of real and ﬁnancial options, but
their use on the ﬁnancing side of corporate balance sheets is an infant industry. The short list of com-
putational papers on ﬁnancing includes Mello and Parsons (1992), Leland (1994, 1998), Boyd and Smith
(1994), Parrino and Weisbach (1999), Robe (1999, 2001), Parrino, Poteshman and Weisbach (2002) and Ju,
Parrino, Poteshman and Weisbach (2004). These papers explore the tradeoﬀ theory of capital structure and
the risk-shifting incentives created by debt ﬁnancing.
1theoretical work.
1.1 Venture capital contracting
Venture capital brings together one or more entrepreneurs, who contribute ideas, plans, hu-
man capital and eﬀort, and private investors, who contribute experience, expertise, contacts
and most of the money. For simplicity, we will refer to one entrepreneur and to one initial
venture-capital investor. Their joint participation creates a two-way incentive problem. The
investor has to share ﬁnancial payoﬀs with the entrepreneur in order to secure her commit-
ment and eﬀort. Thus the investor may not be willing to participate even if the startup has
positive overall NPV. Second, the entrepreneur will underinvest in eﬀort if she has to share
her marginal value added with the investor.2
1.1.1 Sweat equity
The entrepreneur invests even when she puts up none of the ﬁnancing. She contributes her
eﬀort and absorbs part of the ﬁrm’s business risk. The diﬀerence between her salary and
her outside compensation is an opportunity cost. Specialization of her human capital to the
new ﬁrm also creates an opportunity cost if the ﬁrm fails.3
The entrepreneur receives shares in exchange for these investments. These shares may not
vest immediately, and they are illiquid unless and until the ﬁrm is sold or goes public.4 The
venture capitalist frequently requires the entrepreneur to sign a contract that precludes work
for a competitor. The entrepreneur therefore has a strong incentive to stick with the ﬁrm
and make it successful. In our model, the entrepreneur contributes no ﬁnancial investment
and is willing to continue so long as the present value of her shares exceeds her costs of eﬀort.
1.1.2 Staged investment and ﬁnancing
A startup is a compound call option. Financing and investment are made in stages. The
stages match up with business milestones, such as a demonstration of technology or a suc-
cessful product introduction.
We assume that the entrepreneur and venture capitalist cannot write a complete contract
to specify the terms of future ﬁnancing. The terms are determined by bargaining as ﬁnancing
is raised stage by stage. If additional investors join in later stages, the bargain has to be
acceptable to them as well as the entrepreneur and initial venture capitalist.
The option value added by staging is obvious, but staging may also serve other purposes.
In Bergemann and Hege (1998) and N¨ oldeke and Schmidt (1998), staging allows the venture
capitalist to learn the startup’s value and thereby induce the entrepreneur’s eﬀort. In Neher
2This is an extreme version of Myers’s (1977) underinvestment problem.
3This opportunity cost could perhaps be reduced if new ventures are developed as divisions of larger
ﬁrms. See Gromb and Scharfstein (2003) and Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2003).
4Employees typically receive options that vest gradually as employment continues and the startup sur-
vives. But our entrepreneur is a founder, not an employee hired later. Founders typically receive shares, not
options. The entrepreneur’s shares are fully vested, but additional shares may be granted later. See Kaplan
and Str¨ omberg (2003).
2(1996) and Landier (2002), the venture capitalist’s ability to deny ﬁnancing at each stage
forces the entrepreneur to exert higher eﬀort and prevents her from diverting cash ﬂows.
Venture capital investors usually buy convertible preferred shares. If the ﬁrm is shut
down, the investors have a senior claim on any remaining assets. The shares convert to
common stock if the ﬁrm is sold or taken public.5 Ordinary debt ﬁnancing is rarely used,
although we will consider whether debt could serve as an alternative source of ﬁnancing.
1.1.3 Control
The venture capitalist does not have complete control of the new ﬁrm. For example, Kaplan
and Str¨ omberg (2003, Table 2) ﬁnd that venture-capital investors rarely control a majority of
the board of directors. But Kaplan and Str¨ omberg also ﬁnd that venture capitalists’ control
increases when the ﬁrm’s progress is unsatisfactory.
Staged ﬁnancing can give incumbent venture capitalists eﬀective control over access to
ﬁnancing. Their refusal to participate in the second or later rounds of ﬁnancing would send a
strong negative signal to other potential investors and probably deter them from investing.6
In practice, the incumbents’ decision not to participate is usually a decision to shut down
the ﬁrm.
Giving venture capitalists eﬀective veto power over later-stage investment is in some
respects eﬃcient. The decision to shut down or continue cannot be left to the entrepreneur,
who is usually happy to continue investing someone else’s money as long as there is any
chance of success. The venture capitalist is better equipped to decide whether to exercise
each stage of the compound call option.
Thus staged ﬁnancing has a double beneﬁt, at least for the venture capitalist. It can block
the entrepreneur’s incentive to continue and it allows the venture capitalist to exploit the
startup’s real-option value. But it is also costly if the venture capitalist can use the threat of
shutdown to hold up the entrepreneur and dilute her stake. Anticipated dilution feeds back
into the entrepreneur’s incentives and eﬀort and reduces overall value. This is the holdup
problem of staged ﬁnancing. For a wide range of parameter values we ﬁnd that the holdup
problem is so severe that the venture capitalist is better oﬀ abandoning staged ﬁnancing and
providing all ﬁnancing upfront. When later ﬁnancing stages are syndicated on competitive
terms, however, staged ﬁnancing is always more eﬃcient than full upfront ﬁnancing. We will
also show that the holdup problem cannot be solved simply by substituting debt for equity
ﬁnancing. When contracts are incomplete, stage by stage bargaining enables the incumbent
venture capitalist to extract surplus regardless of the form of ﬁnancing.
Most prior theory assumes that venture-capital investors retain residual rights of control.
The venture capitalist’s rights to decide on investment (Aghion and Bolton (1992)) and to
replace the entrepreneur (Fluck (1998), Hellman (1998), Myers (2000), Fluck (2001)) play
an important role in enforcing ﬁnancial contracts between investors and entrepreneurs. The
5The use of convertible securities in venture capital is analyzed in Green (1984), Berglof (1994), Kalay
and Zender (1997), Repullo and Suarez (1998), Cornelli and Yosha (2003), Schmidt (2003) and Winton and
Yerramilli (2003).
6The role of the monopolist ﬁnancier was investigated in Rajan (1992), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and
Cestone wand White (2004).
3entrepreneur’s option to reacquire control and realize value in an initial public oﬀering is
a key incentive in Black and Gilson (1998), Myers (2000) and Aghion, Bolton and Tirole
(2001).
1.1.4 Syndication of later-stage ﬁnancing
Later-stage ﬁnancing usually comes from a syndicate of incumbent and new venture-capital
investors. We show how a commitment to syndicate can alleviate the holdup problem by
assuring the entrepreneur more favorable terms in later rounds of ﬁnancing. This encourages
eﬀort in all periods, which increases overall value.
Syndication of venture capital investments has been explained in several other ways.
It is one way to gather additional information about a startup’s value — see, for example,
Gompers and Lerner (2002, Ch. 9) and Sah and Stiglitz (1986). Wilson (1968) attributes
syndication to venture capitalists’ risk aversion. Syndication may also reﬂect tacit collusion:
early investors syndicate later rounds of ﬁnancing, and the syndicati o np a r t n e r sr e t u r nt h e
favor when they develop promising startups (Pichler and Wilhelm (2001)). In Cassamatta
and Haritchabalet (2004), venture capitalists acquire diﬀerent skills and experience and
syndication pools their expertise. We oﬀer a diﬀerent rationale: syndication can protect the
entrepreneur from ex post holdup by investors and thereby encourage eﬀort.
1.1.5 Exit
Entrepreneurs can rely on venture capitalists to cash out of successful startups. Venture
capital generally comes from limited-life partnerships, and the partners are not paid until
the startups are sold or taken public. Myers (2000) shows that venture capitalists would
cash out voluntarily in order to avoid the adverse incentives of long-term private ownership.
Chelma, Habib and Lyngquist (2002) consider how the various provisions of venture-
capital contracts are designed to mitigate multiple agency and information problems. Their
paper focuses on exit provisions and does not consider syndication.
1.2 Preview of the model and results
We aim to capture the most important features of venture capital. For simplicity we assume
two stages of ﬁnancing and investment at dates 0 and 1. If successful, the ﬁrm is sold or
taken public at date 2, and the entrepreneur and the investors cash out. The entrepreneur
and the investors are risk-neutral NPV maximizers, although the entrepreneur’s NPV is net
of the costs of her eﬀort.
We value the startup as a real option. The underlying asset is the potential market value
of the ﬁrm, which we assume is lognormally distributed. But full realization of potential
value requires maximum eﬀort from the entrepreneur at dates 0 and 1. The entrepreneur’s
eﬀo r ti sc o s t l y ,s oh e ro p t i m a le ﬀort is less than the maximum and depends on her expected
s h a r eo ft h ev a l u eo ft h eﬁrm at date 2. The venture capitalist and the entrepreneur negotiate
ownership percentages at date 0, but these percentages change at date 1 when additional
ﬁnancing is raised and invested.
4We assume that the ﬁrm cannot start or continue without the entrepreneur. If ﬁnancing
cannot be arranged on terms that satisfy her participation constraints, no investment is
made and the ﬁrm shuts down. The venture capitalist’s date-0 and date-1 participation
constraints must also be met, since he will not invest if his NPV is negative.
The eﬃciency of venture-capital investment hinges on the nature and terms of ﬁnancing.
We compare six cases.
1. First-best. If the entrepreneur could ﬁnance the startup out of her own pocket, she
would maximize overall value, net of the required ﬁnancial investments and her costs
of eﬀort. First-best is our main benchmark for testing the eﬃciency of other cases.
2. Fully competitive. In this case, ﬁnancing is available on competitive terms (NPV = 0)
at both date 0 and date 1, which gives the highest possible value when the entrepreneur
must raise capital from outside investors. We include this case as an alternative bench-
mark to ﬁrst-best.
3. Monopoly, staged investment. Here the initial venture capitalist can dictate the terms
of ﬁnancing at dates 0 and 1 and can hold up the entrepreneur at date 1.7 The venture
capitalist does not squeeze the last dollar from the entrepreneur’s stake, however. He
squeezes just enough in each period to maximize the present value of his shares.
4. Monopoly, no staging. In this case, the venture capitalist commits all necessary funds
at date 0 and lets the entrepreneur decide whether to continue at date 1. This means
ineﬃcient investment decisions at date 1, because the entrepreneur is usually better oﬀ
continuing, even when the odds of success are low and overall NPV is negative. But
eﬀort increases at both date 0 and date 1, because the venture capitalist can no longer
control the terms of later-stage ﬁnancing. This case helps clarify the tradeoﬀ between
the real-option value of staged investment and the under-provision of eﬀort because of
the holdup problem.
5. Syndication. In this case a syndicate of additional investors joins the original venture
capitalist at date 1. We assume that the syndicate ﬁnancing comes on more com-
petitive terms than in the monopoly case, for simplicity we will focus on the fully
competitive case (NPV = 0). Syndication mitigates the holdup problem, increasing
the entrepreneur’s eﬀort and overall NPV.
6. Debt. Venture capitalists rarely ﬁnance startups with ordinary debt, but we neverthe-
less consider debt ﬁnancing brieﬂya sa na l t e r n a t i v e .D e b tﬁnancing eﬀectively gives
the entrepreneur a call option on the startup’s ﬁnal value at date 2.
We assume that the initial venture capitalist and the entrepreneur are equally informed
about potential value, although potential value is not veriﬁable and contractible. But ﬁ-
nancing terms in the syndication case depend on the information available to new investors.
We start by assuming complete information, but also consider asymmetric information and
explore whether the terms of the incumbent venture capitalist’s participation in date-1 ﬁ-
nancing could reveal the incumbent’s inside information.
7This would be the case if the venture capitalist decided that certain non-veriﬁable performance milestones
had not been met.
5We solve the model for each ﬁnancing case over a wide range of input parameters, in-
cluding the potential value of the ﬁrm, the variance of this value, the amount and timing of
required investment and the marginal costs and payoﬀso fe ﬀort. We report a representative
subset of results in Table 1 and Figures 3 through 10. Results are especially sensitive to the
marginal costs and payoﬀso fe ﬀort, so we vary these parameters over very wide ranges. Our
main results include the following:
1. We ﬁnd economically signiﬁcant value losses, relative to ﬁrst best, even when the dollar-
equivalent cost of eﬀort is a small fraction of required ﬁnancial investment. Thus many
startups with positive NPVs cannot be ﬁnanced. Value losses decline as the marginal
beneﬁto fe ﬀort increases or the marginal cost declines.
2. Value losses are especially high in the monopoly case with staged investment, where
the incumbent venture capitalist can dictate the terms of ﬁnancing at date 1. For
a wide range of parameter values, both the venture capitalist and entrepreneur are
better oﬀ in the no-staging case with full upfront ﬁnancing. That is, the costs of the
no-staging case (ineﬃcient investment at date 1) can be less than the value loss due to
under-provision of eﬀort in the monopoly, staged ﬁnancing case.
3. Syndicate ﬁnancing at date 1 increases eﬀort and the date-0 NPVs of both the en-
trepreneur and the initial venture capitalist. The venture capitalist is better oﬀ than
in the monopoly case, despite taking a smaller share of the venture. Moreover, staged
ﬁnancing with syndication always produces higher overall values than the no-staging
case. The combination of staged ﬁnancing and later-stage syndication dominates the
alternative of giving the entrepreneur all the money upfront.
4. Syndicate ﬁnancing is most eﬀective when new investors are fully informed. The incum-
bent venture capitalist may be able to reveal his information through his participation
in date-1 ﬁnancing. However, the ﬁxed-fraction participation rule derived by Admati
and Pﬂeiderer (1994) does not achieve truthful information revelation in our model,
because the terms of ﬁnancing eﬀect the entrepreneur’s eﬀort. The ﬁxed-fraction rule
would lead the venture capitalist to over-report the startup’s value: the higher the
price paid by new investors, the more the entrepreneur’s existing shares are worth, and
the harder she works. The incumbent venture capitalist captures part of the gain from
her extra eﬀort. A modiﬁed ﬁxed-fraction rule works in some cases, however. With the
modiﬁed rule, the incumbent’s fractional participation increases as the reported value
increases.
5. We expected venture-capital contracting to be more eﬃcient for high-variance invest-
ments, but that is not generally true. Increasing the variance of potential value some-
times increases value losses, relative to ﬁrst best, and sometimes reduces them, de-
pending on eﬀort parameters and the ﬁnancing case assumed.
6. Debt ﬁnancing does not solve the holdup problem, because the venture capitalist can
still squeeze the entrepreneur by demanding a high interest rate on debt issued at date
1. Debt ﬁnancing is more eﬃcient in some cases but not generally. Debt can improve
the entrepreneur’s incentives at later ﬁnancing stages, but many startups that can be
ﬁnanced with equity cannot raise ﬁnancing by issuing debt. Switching from equity to
6debt ﬁnancing does add value in some cases, but not generally. In most cases, syndicate
ﬁnancing with equity rather than debt increases both overall NPV and the NPV to
the original venture capitalist.
W er e c o g n i z et h a tw eh a v el e f to u ts e v e r a l aspects of venture capital that could inﬂuence
our results. First, we ignore risk aversion. The venture capitalist and entrepreneur are
assumed risk-neutral. This is reasonable for venture capitalists, who have access to ﬁnancial
markets.8 It is less reasonable for entrepreneurs, who can’t hedge or diversify payoﬀs without
damaging incentives.9
Second, we do not explicitly model the costs and value added of the venture capitalist’s
eﬀort. We are treating his eﬀort as a cost sunk at startup and ﬁxed afterwards. In eﬀect, we
assume that if the venture capitalist decides to invest, he will exert appropriate eﬀort, and
that the cost of this eﬀort is rolled into the required investment.
Third, we assume that ﬁnal payoﬀs to the entrepreneur and venture-capital investors
depend only on the number of shares bargained for at dates 0 and 1. We do not explic-
itly model the more complex, contingent contracts observed in some cases by Kaplan and
Str¨ omberg (2003),10 and we do not attempt to derive the optimal ﬁnancial contracts for our
model setup. However, our results in Section 4 suggest that the use of contingent share
awards may facilitate truthful revelation of information by the initial venture capitalist to
members of a later-stage ﬁnancing syndicate.
Finally, we do not model the search and screening processes that bring the entrepreneur
and venture capitalist together in the ﬁrst place. The costs and eﬀectiveness of these pro-
cesses could aﬀect the terms of ﬁnancing.11 For example, if an entrepreneur’s search for alter-
native ﬁnancing would be cheap and quick, the initial venture capitalist’s bargaining power is
reduced. Giving the entrepreneur the option to search for another initial investor would not
change the structure of our model, however. It would simply tighten the entrepreneur’s par-
ticipation constraint at date 0 and thereby reduce the intial venture capitalist’s bargaining
power.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up our model and solves
the ﬁrst-best case. Section 3 covers monopoly ﬁnancing with and without staging. Section
4 covers the syndication and fully competitive cases. Numerical results are summarized and
interpreted in Section 5. Section 6 brieﬂy considers debt ﬁnancing. Section 7 sums up our
conclusions and notes questions remaining open for further research.
8Of course, the venture capitalist will seek an expected rate of return high enough to cover the market
rate of risk in the startup. The payoﬀs in our model can be interpreted as certainty equivalents.
9Perhaps the entrepreneur’s risk aversion is cancelled out by optimism. See Landier and Thesmar (2003).
10Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2003, Table 3) ﬁnd contingent contracts in 73% of the ﬁnancing rounds in their
sample. The most common contingent contract depends on the founding entrepreneur staying with the ﬁrm,
for example a contract requiring the entrepreneur’s shares to vest. Vesting is implicit in our model, because
the entrepreneur gets nothing if the ﬁrm is shut down at date 1. Contingent contracts are also triggered by
sale of securities, as in IPOs, or by default on a dividend or redemption payment. But solving the incentive
and moral hazard problems in our model would require contracts contingent on eﬀort or interim performance,
which are non-veriﬁable in our model. Such contracts are rare in Kaplan and Str¨ omberg’s sample.
11Inderst and Muller (2003) present a model of costly search and screening, with bargaining and endogenous
eﬀort by both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. Their model does not consider staged investment
and ﬁnancing.
72 Model Setup and the First-Best Case
The entrepreneur possesses a startup investment opportunity that requires investments I0
and I1 at dates 0 and 1. If both investments are made, the startup continues to date 2 and
the ﬁnal value of the ﬁrm is realized.
If the investment at date 1 is not made, or if the entrepreneur refuses to participate, the
startup is shut down and liquidated. We assume for simplicity that liquidation value is
zero. (It is typically small for high-tech startups.) This assumption simpliﬁes our analysis
of ﬁnancing, because the venture capitalist’s preferred shares have value only if converted.
Thus, we can treat these shares as if they were common in the ﬁrst place.
The total payoﬀ at date 2 is P, which is stochastic and depends on the entrepreneur’s
eﬀo r ta tt i m e0a n dt i m e1 ,x0 and x1,a n do nV2,t h ep o t e n t i a lv a l u eo ft h eﬁrm at date 2.
Eﬀort aﬀects the payoﬀ multiplicatively through the eﬀort functions f0(x0)a n df1(x1):
P = f0f1V2 (1)
Eﬀort generates positive but decreasing returns, that is, f(0) = 0, f>0a n df   < 0.
The entrepreneur bears the costs of her eﬀort, g0(x0)a n dg1(x1). The eﬀort cost function is
strictly increasing and convex, that is, g(0) ≥ 0, g  > 0a n dg   > 0.
The potential value V2 is the sole source of uncertainty. We deﬁne the expected value
E1(V2)a td a t e1a sV1 and expected value E0(V2)a td a t e0a sV0. The expected payoﬀsa t
dates 0 and 1, assuming that the ﬁrm will survive until date 2, are:
E1(P)=E1(f0f1V2)=f0f1E1(V2)=f0f1V1
E0(P)=E0(E1(P)) = f0E0(f1V1|V0) (2)
where E0(f1V1|V0)i sa ni n t e g r a lt h a ta c c o u nts for the dependence of f1 on V1. We assume
risk-neutrality and a risk-free interest rate of zero. We use lognormal probability distributions
for V1 and V2, with standard deviation σ per period.
Deﬁne the eﬀort function f and the eﬀort cost function g as
ft =1− e−θfxt
gt = eθgxt (3)
for t =0 , 1 .T h ee ﬀort function f asymptotes to 1, so we interpret V1 and V2 as maximum
attainable values as x →∞ . The degree of concavity and convexity of f and g depends on
θf and θg.T h e e ﬀort functions are plotted in Figure 1 for several values of θf and θg.
The timeline of the ﬁnancing process is as follows:
− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− →
t = 0t = 1t = 2
V0 known V1 realized V2 realized
αC
0 determined αC
1 determined P = f0f1V2
I0, x∗
0 invested if NPVM
0 ≥ 0 I1, x∗
1 invested if NPVM
1 ≥ 0
and NPVC
0 ≥ 0a n d NPVC
1 ≥ 0
8First, the entrepreneur (M) goes to the initial venture capitalist (C) to raise startup ﬁnanc-
ing. If he is willing to invest, then she and he negotiate the initial ownership shares αM
0
and αC
0 .A td a t e1 ,V1 is observed and there is another round of bargaining over the terms
of ﬁnancing. If the initial venture capitalist also supplies all ﬁnancing at date 1, then he
can dictate the terms and his share becomes αC
1 , with a corresponding adjustment in αM
1 .
If the initial venture capitalist brings in a syndicate of new investors at date 1, then the
syndicate receives an ownership share of αS
1, and αM
1 and αC
1 adjust accordingly. The terms
of ﬁnancing are ﬁxed after date 1.
2.1 First-best
In the ﬁrst-best case, the entrepreneur supplies all of the money, I0 + I1, and owns the ﬁrm
(αM
0 = αM
1 = 1). The entrepreneur maximizes NPV net of her costs of eﬀort. If she decides
to invest, she expends the optimal eﬀorts x 
0 and x 
1.
The entrepreneur has a compound real call option. The exercise price at date 1 is
endogenous, however, because it includes the cost of eﬀort, and eﬀort depends on the realized
potential value f0V1. Since we use the lognormal, our solutions will resemble the Black-
Scholes formula, with extra terms capturing the cost of eﬀort.
We now derive the ﬁrst-best investment strategy, solving backwards. Details of this and
subsequent derivations are in the Appendix. By date 1, the entrepreneur’s date-0 eﬀort and
investment are sunk. Her date-1 NPV is
NPV
M
1 =m a x [ 0 ,max
x1 (f0f1(x1)V1 − g1(x1) − I1)] (4)




1, which determines optimal eﬀort x 
1 and the
beneﬁta n dc o s to fe ﬀort, f1(x 
1)a n dg1(x 
1).
Deﬁn et h es t r i k ev a l u eV 1 such that NPVM
1 (V 1) = 0. The entrepreneur exercises her
option to invest at date 1 when V1 > V 1 and NPVM
1 > 0. This strike value is similar to
the strike price of a traded option, except that the strike value has to cover the cost of the
entrepreneur’s eﬀort g1(x 
1)a sw e l la st h ei n v e s t m e n tI1.
At date 0, the entrepreneur anticipates her choice of eﬀort and continuation decision at
date 1. She determines the eﬀort level x0 that maximizes NPV0, the diﬀerence between the
expected NPV at date 1 and the immediate investment I0 and cost of eﬀort x0.
NPV
M
0 =m a x [ 0 ,max
x0 (E0(NPV
M
1 (x0)) − g0(x0) − I0)]
E0(NPVM
1 (x0)) depends on x0 in two ways. First, increasing eﬀort at date 0 increases f0,
and thus increases the value of the startup when it is in the money at date 1. Second,
increasing eﬀort at date 0 decreases the strike value V 1 for investment at date 1 and makes
it more likely that the startup will continue.
The tradeoﬀ between eﬀort cost and startup value is illustrated in Figure 2. The top
payoﬀ line is the date-1 NPV for a call option with no cost of eﬀort. In this case the value
would be V1 and the strike price I1.T h e l o w e r p a y o ﬀ line shows the net NPV when the
9entrepreneur exerts less than the maximum eﬀort at date 0 (f0 < 1). NPV1 is close to linear
in V1, but the slope and the level of NPV1 are reduced by the cost of eﬀort. We have added
a lognormal distribution to show the probability weights assigned to these NPVs. The two
horizontal lines are the date-0 ﬁnancial investment I0 and the full cost I0 +g0 of investment
and eﬀort.
We calculate E0(NPV1)b yi n t e g r a t i n gf r o mV 1(x0). Since NPVM
1 (x0,V 1(x0)) = 0, the


















































where Π(V ) is the lognormal density and θr = θf/θg.
We solve for x 






0 −I0. When NPVM
0 (x 
0) > 0, the entrepreneur
invests and the ﬁrm is up and running.
Table 1 includes examples of ﬁrst-best numerical results. Start with the ﬁrst two lines
of Panel A, which report Black-Scholes and ﬁrst-best results when potential value is V0 =
E0(V2) = 150 and required investments are I0, I1 = 50, 50. The standard deviation is σ =0 .4
per period. The eﬀort parameters are θf =1 .8a n dθg =0 .6, so the value added by eﬀort
is high relative to the cost. Thus the option to invest in the startup should be well in the
money, even after the costs of eﬀort are deducted.
If the costs of eﬀort were zero, ﬁrst-best NPV could be calculated from the Black-Scholes
formula, with a date-1 strike price of V =5 0 .B u tw h e nt h ec o s to fe ﬀort is introduced, V
increases and NPV declines. First-best NPV is 37.90, less than the Black-Scholes NPV by
12.13. The diﬀerence reﬂects the cost of eﬀort and the increase in strike value to V =5 5 .35.12
Panel B repeats the example with higher standard deviation of σ =0 .8. Panels C and D
a s s u m el o w e ri n v e s t m e n ta td a t e0a n dh i g h e ri n v e s t m e n ta td a t e1( I0, I1 = 10, 90). NPV
increases for higher standard deviations and when more investment can be deferred. The
ﬁrst-best initial eﬀort decreases in these cases, though not dramatically. Panels E and F
assume θf =0 .6, so that eﬀo r ti sl e s se ﬀective, and also back-loaded investment (again, I0,
I1 = 10, 90).13 First-best eﬀort actually increases, compared to panels C and D, but NPV
declines dramatically.
12The eﬀort parameters in panel A of Table 1 are θf =1 .8a n dθg =0 .6. Date 0 eﬀort is x0 =2 .4, so
f0 =0 .99 and g0 =4 .59. O fc o u r s et h ed a t e0e ﬀort is sunk by date 1. From (4), f∗
1 =0 .978 and g∗
1 =3 .58.
The breakeven value level V =5 5 .35 is determined by 0.99 × 0.978 × 55.35 − 3.58 = I1 = 50.
13We do not include panels for equal investment (I0, I1 = 50, 50) and θf =0 .6, because NPVs are negative
in all cases where outside venture-capital ﬁnancing is required. A startup with these parameters could not
be ﬁnanced.
10Figure 3 plots ﬁrst-best NPV for a wide range of standard deviations and eﬀort parame-
ters. Due to exponential function choice, only θr = θf/θg, the ratio of the eﬀort parameters,
matters, so that ratio is used on the bottom-left axis. The ratio is θr = 3 in Panels A to
Do fT a b l e1a n dθr =1 .0i nP a n e l sEa n dF .I nF i g u r e3 ,θr is varied from 1/11 to 11.
The startup becomes worthwhile, with ﬁrst-best NPV ≥ 0, for θr slightly below 1.0. NPV
increases rapidly for higher values of θr,t h e nﬂattens out. NPV also increases with standard
deviation, especially when most investment can be deferred to date 1.
3 Monopoly ﬁnancing and staged investment
Now we explore the monopoly case in which the entrepreneur approaches the venture capi-
talist for ﬁnancing and the initial venture capitalist can dictate terms of ﬁnancing at both
date 0 and date 1, subject to the entrepreneur’s participation constraints. The venture
capitalist will not exploit all his bargaining power, however, because of the feedback to the
entrepreneur’s eﬀort. In some cases, the venture capitalist is better oﬀ if he gives up bar-
gaining power and gives the entrepreneur all the ﬁnancing upfront. We do not argue that
the monopoly case is realistic, but it is a useful benchmark, and we believe that venture
capitalists do have bargaining power, especially in early-stage ﬁnancing, and receive at least
some (quasi) rents.
By “terms of ﬁnancing” we mean the fraction of common shares held by the entrepreneur
and venture capitalist at dates 0 and 1. The entrepreneur’s fractional share at dates 1 and
2i sαM
1 , the complement of αC
1 . The entrepreneur’s share at date 0 is irrelevant in the
monopoly case, because a monopolist venture capitalist can force the terms of ﬁnancing at
date 1 and is free to dilute shares awarded earlier. We do assume that the entrepreneur has
clear property rights to her shares at date 2 and that these shares cannot be taken away or
diluted between dates 1 and 2. The division of the ﬁnal payoﬀ P is enforceable once date-1
ﬁnancing is completed.
3.1 Eﬀort and investment at date 1.
Both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist now have the option to participate at date
1. There are two derivative claims on one underlying asset. Both must be exercised in order
for the project to proceed.
At date 1 the entrepreneur decides whether to exercise her option to continue, based on
her strike price, the cost of optimal eﬀort g1(x 




1 and decides whether to put up the ﬁnancial investment I1. We can focus on the
venture capitalist’s decision if we incorporate the entrepreneur’s response into the venture
capitalist’s optimization problem.
The equation for the entrepreneur’s NPV is similar to Eq. (4), except that the second-







1 )=m a x [ 0 ,max
x1 (α
M
1 f0f1(x1)V1 − g1(x1))] (6)




1 (max) and αM
1 (min). When αM
1 (min) ≥ αM
1 , the entrepreneur will not
participate.14 The venture capitalist chooses αC 
1 to maximize his date-1 NPV, subject to
his and the entrepreneur’s participation constraints.
NPV
C















If the entrepreneur’s participation constraint is binding, the venture capitalist assigns
αC
1 (max). Otherwise, he assigns an interior value. But in most of our experiments, V
C
1 ,t h e






where the entrepreneur’s NPV is positive. In these cases the venture capitalist is better oﬀ
by taking a share αC
1 < αC
1 (max) in order to give the entrepreneur stronger incentives. Nev-
ertheless, those incentives are weaker than ﬁrst-best, because αM 
1 (x0) < 1, which decreases
the expected payoﬀ by reducing x 
1.
Figure 4 plots values of αC
1 as a function of V1 when I0 = I1 =50, σ =0 .4,θf =1 .8,
and θg =0 .6, the same parameters used in Panel A of Table 1. The optimal share αC 
1
is less than the maximum share αC
1 (max) = 1 − αM
1 (min) for all V1 ≥ V
C,t h ev e n t u r e
capitalist’s strike value at date 1. Thus the maximum share that the venture capitalist could
extract is irrelevant. But notice that the venture capitalist’s optimum share increases as the
project becomes more valuable, with a corresponding decline in the entrepreneur’s share.
This implication of the monopoly case is contrary to the evidence in Kaplan and Stromberg
(2003), who ﬁnd that entrepreneurs gain an increasing fraction of payoﬀsa sa n di ft h eﬁrm
succeeds. This suggests that in practice later-stage venture-capital ﬁnancing is not provided
on monopolistic terms.
Assuming the αC
1 (max) constraint does not bind, we compute V
C






1 )t h a ts e t sNPVC
1 equal to zero. Investment occurs if V1 > V
C
1 .
3.2 Eﬀort and exercise at date 0.
In the ﬁrst-best case, the entrepreneur anticipates x 
1 and I1 in her choice of x0.I n t h e
monopoly case, the entrepreneur also anticipates the venture capitalist’s decisions at date
1. She then evaluates whether NPVC
0 (x 
0) ≥ 0. As in the ﬁrst-best case, higher eﬀort at
t = 0 lowers the threshold for investment at t = 1 (makes it more likely that both the
entrepreneur’s and venture capitalist’s options are in the money) and increases the value of
the project when the option is in the money.
The entrepreneur’s date 0 value is
NPV
M
0 =m a x [ 0 ,max
x0 (E0(NPV
M
1 (x0)) − g0(x0))] (8)

















14When f0 is small or V1 is low, αM
1 (min) may be greater than 1, so that continuation is impossible even
if the entrepreneur is given 100% ownership.
12Here there are no closed-form expressions. We solve the ﬁrst-order condition and de-
termine x∗
0 numerically. Given x∗
0, and assuming that the entrepreneur wants to go ahead
(NPVM
0 (x∗
0) > 0), the venture capitalist invests if:
NPV
C




0)) − I0] > 0( 1 0 )
Thus two options must be exercised at date 0 in order to launch the startup. The
entrepreneur picks x∗
0 to maximize the value of her option to continue at date 1, and then
determines whether this value exceeds her current strike price, the immediate cost of eﬀort
g∗
0. The venture capitalist values his option to invest I1 at date 1, taking the entrepreneur’s
immediate and future eﬀort into account, and then decides whether to invest I0.
Monopoly ﬁnancing can be extremely ineﬃcient. The venture capitalist’s ability to claim
a large ownership fraction at date 1 reduces the entrepreneur’s eﬀo r ta td a t e0a sw e l la sd a t e
1, reducing value and increasing the venture capitalist’s breakeven point V
C
1 . For example,
compare the monopoly and ﬁrst-best results in Panel A of Table 1. The entrepreneur’s
initial eﬀort falls by about 50 percent from the ﬁrst-best level and the date-1 strike value V
C
1
increases by almost 30 percent. The entrepreneur’s NPV drops by more than 90 percent.
Overall NPV drops by more than half. Similar value losses occur in panels B to F. In Panel
E, a startup with ﬁrst-best NPV of 10.98 cannot be ﬁnanced in the monopoly case. NPV
w o u l db en e g a t i v ef o rb o t ht h ee n t r e p r e n e u ra n dt h ei n i t i a lv e n t u r ec a p i t a l i s t .
3.3 Monopoly ﬁnancing without staged investment
The incentive problems of the monopoly case can sometimes overwhelm the option-like ad-
vantages of staged ﬁnancing. All may be better oﬀ if the entire investment I0+ I1 is given
to the entrepreneur upfront and she is granted full control thereafter.
In the monopoly, no-staging case, the entrepreneur and venture capitalist bargain only
once at date 0 to determine their ownership shares αM and αC, which are then ﬁxed for
dates 1 and 2. The entrepreneur calculates her NPV at date 1 just as in the monopoly
case with staging, but her share of the ﬁrm αM
1 is predetermined. Also, she ignores the
ﬁnancial investment I1 a n dc o n t i n u e sa td a t e1s ol o n ga sh e rN P Ve x c e e d sh e rc o s to fe ﬀort,
g1(x 
1).15 The venture capitalist retains monopoly power over ﬁnancing at date 0, but loses
all his bargaining power at date 1. He sets αC to maximize his NPV at date 0, taking into
account the eﬀects on the entrepreneur’s eﬀort at dates 0 and 1. His maximization problem




0 are diﬀerent. The




0 . If both parties’ participation constraints are met at date 0 (NPVC
0 ≥ 0
and NPVM
0 ≥ 0), the startup is launched.
The value loss from the holdup problem in the monopoly, staged ﬁnancing case can be
so severe that it can actually exceed the cost of ineﬃcient continuation in the no-staging
case. For example, note the improvement in the no-staging case in Panel A of Table 1. The
15We do assume that the entrepreneur cannot launch the ﬁrm at date 0 and then run oﬀ with the date-1
investment I1. Venture-capital investors typically hold convertible preferred shares and have priority in
liquidation.
13NPV to the entrepreneur more than doubles, compared to the monopoly case with staged
investment, and overall NPV increases from 16.47 to 26.89.
Figures 5 and 6 compare the monopoly NPVs with and without staging. Figure 5 assumes
equal investment in both periods (I0, I1 = 50, 50). Here NPV is higher without staging,
except at extremely high standard deviations. Figure 6 assumes back-loaded investment (I0,
I1 = 10, 90), which adds to option value and the value of staging. In Figure 6, a monopolist
venture capitalist would give up staging and provide 100% upfront ﬁnancing only at relatively
low standard deviations.
4 Syndication
The value losses in the monopoly case would be reduced if the entrepreneur could promise
higher eﬀort at date 1, or if the venture capitalist could promise to take a lower ownership
fraction αC
1 . Neither promise is credible, however, since eﬀort and potential value are non-
contractible. But suppose that the venture capitalist can commit (explicitly or implicitly)
to bring in a syndicate of new investors to join him in the date-1 ﬁnancing. Suppose further
that the incumbent venture capitalist does not collude with syndicate members and allows
them to dictate the terms of ﬁnancing. We will show that these commitments are in the
initial venture capitalist’s interest. Syndication alleviates the holdup problem and generates
extra eﬀort and value.
Syndication of later stage ﬁnancing is common in practice. The initial venture capitalist
approaches a group of other venture-capital investors that he has worked with in the past,
or hopes to work with in the future, and oﬀers participation in the ﬁnancing. We interpret
syndication as a mechanism that introduces competition into date-1 ﬁnancing and restrains
the initial venture capitalist’s temptation to hold up the entrepreneur. We do not know
w h a tN P Vs y n d i c a t e so b t a i ni np r a c t i c e ,b u ti t is natural to explore NPV = 0 as a limiting
case. (If the syndicate gets positive NPV, but still less than a monopolist venture capitalist
could extract, there are still value gains relative to the monopoly case.) We start with the
full-information case, where the investors who compete to join the syndicate have the same
information as the incumbent venture capitalist.16
The results for syndicate ﬁnancing diﬀer from the monopoly case in at least two ways.
First, the terms of ﬁnancing shift in the entrepreneur’s favor. The new syndicate investors
are forward-looking. They do not care about the value of the existing shares held by the
incumbent venture capitalist and have no incentive to hold up the entrepreneur. The in-
cumbent has no control over the terms of ﬁnancing at date 1, so his ultimate ownership
and payoﬀ are determined by his initial share αC
0 and the performance of the startup. The
syndicate accepts NPVS = 0 and does not trade oﬀ extra NPV against reduced eﬀort from
the entrepreneur. Thus the syndicate’s ownership share αS
1 will generate lower NPVS than
the NPV-maximizing share αC∗
1 that a monopolist incumbent would set. The entrepreneur
suﬀers less dilution, exerts more eﬀort, and total value increases. This outcome beneﬁts the
initial venture capitalist at date 0. By delegating the terms of date-1 ﬁnancing, he solves the
16We doubt that potential syndicate investors really have full information. If they did, then the en-
trepreneur could negotiate with these investors directly and possibly hold up the incumbent venture capi-
talist. This scenario seems implausible and we do not explore it in this paper.
14incomplete contracting problem that causes the holdup problem in the monopoly case with
staged ﬁnancing.
Second, under zero-NPV date-1 ﬁnancing, the initial venture capitalist eﬀectively owns a
call option with a zero exercise price and will always want the investment to proceed at date
1 whether or not the project can generate enough value to cover the syndicate’s investment.
With full information, it does not matter whether the initial venture capitalist participates in
the syndicate, because the syndicate’s investment is zero-NPV. Of course the initial venture
capitalist’s participation matters if the syndication terms are not fully competitive. The
higher the NPV for the syndicate, the closer is the syndicate case to the monopoly case.
4.1 Eﬀort and investment at date 1
For a given share αM
1 , the entrepreneur’s NPV and maximization problem at date 1 are the









1). The share given to the outside syndicate, αS
1, is determined by
NPVS
1 =0 ,t h a ti s ,b yI1 = αS





1 by ﬁnding the value of αS
1 that maximizes NPV1, subject to the constraint that
NPVS = 0 for the syndicate. The solution is generally in the region where NPVM
1 (αS
1) > 0
at V 1 and αM
1 < αM
1 (min).
Figure 7 plots ownership shares against value at date 1 for the syndicate case when
I0,I 1 =5 0 ,50, σ =0 .4, θf =1 .8a n dθg =0 .6, the same parameters used in Panel A of
Table 1. The top two lines show the syndicate’s maximum and optimal shares if the new
investors were given free rein to maximize their NPV. The maximum share is irrelevant, as
in Figure 4. The syndicate’s actual share equals its optimal share at the strike value V
S
1 and
then declines as V1 increases. The shares held by the entrepreneur and incumbent venture
capitalist therefore increase as performance improves, consistent with the evidence in Kaplan
and Stromberg (2003) and contrary to the pattern in the monopoly case, as plotted in Figure
4.
One might expect the better ﬁnancing terms from the syndicate to decrease the strike
value V 1 from the monopoly case. But V 1 is actually higher in the syndicate case — for
example, V 1 is 84.9 in Figure 7 and 70.8 in Figure 4. This increase can be traced to the initial
venture capitalist’s ﬁxed original ownership share in the syndicate-ﬁnancing case. When the
original venture capitalist provides both rounds of ﬁnancing, he picks the share at date 1
that is best for him at date 1. He may reduce his share to strengthen the entrepreneur’s
incentives. Unlike the monopolist, the syndicate cannot reset the venture capitalist’s original
share αC
0 and is there therefore faced with a free-riding incumbent. The syndicate has a
smaller value pie to carve up, and a higher threshold for investment.
Thus the commitment to syndicate later-stage ﬁnancing has two countervailing eﬀects.
The syndicate may require a higher threshold for investment, so that marginal projects will
be rejected more often. On the other hand, syndication provides better incentives for the
entrepreneur, so that low values of f0V1 are less likely. Our numerical analysis will show that
the second eﬀect outweighs the ﬁrst and that shifting from monopoly to syndication always
adds value.
154.2 Renegotiation at date 1
Of course a low realization of V1 could trigger a renegotiation between the incumbent and the
entrepreneur to reset the incumbent’s initial share αC
0 before syndicate ﬁnancing is sought.
The incumbent can transfer ownership to the entrepreneur, retaining αC(R) < αC∗
0 ,w h e r e
αC(R) denotes the incumbent’s renegotiated equity stake. The incumbent may be better
oﬀ a c c e p t i n gar e d u c e do w n e r s h i ps h a r et oi m p r o v et h ec h a n c eo fs u c c e s sf o rl o wv a l u e s
of V1 or to increase continuation for V1 < V
S
1. By accepting a lower ownership share, the
incumbent improves eﬀort incentives for the entrepreneur to the point where enough extra
value is added to support syndicate ﬁnancing at NPV = 0. Of course the incumbent will
give up as little as possible. In the worst renegotiation case, where V1 approaches a lower
bound, the value of the incumbent’s shares approaches zero, just as in the monopoly case.
Renegotiation requires dilution of the incumbent venture capitalist’s ownership share.
Dilution could happen in several ways. For example, the incumbent could provide bridge
ﬁnancing on terms favorable to the entrepreneur. Dilution could also occur in a ”down
round” — a round of ﬁnancing where new investors buy in at a price per share lower than in
previous rounds. But our model says that a down round should dilute the entrepreneur less
than the incumbent venture capitalist. The entrepreneur could be given additional shares
or options, for example.
While renegotiation adds value ex post by improving eﬀort and preserving access to
ﬁnancing, the ﬂexibility to reset shares at date 1 could introduce new problems. Suppose
the initial venture capitalist sets αC
0 at a very high level, knowing that he can renegotiate
down to the monopoly level at date 1, even when the realized value V1 exceeds the syndicate
strike value V
S
1.17 The entrepreneur would then cut back eﬀort at dates 0 and 1 and reduce
the value of the ﬁrm. This strategy amounts to a return to monopoly ﬁnancing. It would
reduce date-0 value to the venture capitalist as well as the entrepreneur.
Thus two conditions must hold in order for syndicate ﬁnancing to work as we have
described it. First, the initial venture capitalist has to commit at date 0 to syndicate at
date 1. In practice this is not an explicit, formal commitment, but syndication is standard
operating procedure. As part of the commitment, the initial venture capitalist has to limit
his initial ownership share αC
0 to its level in the syndicate case, so that he cannot start with a
higher value and bargain down to the monopoly share αC∗
1 at date 1. The commitment is in
the venture capitalist’s interest, because it increases his ex ante value relative to the monopoly
case. Second, the terms of ﬁnancing in later rounds should be reasonably competitive. In
practice they may not be perfectly competitive, but we believe the terms are materially
better for the entrepreneur than the monopoly terms would be.
It turns out that opportunities for renegotiation are rare in our numerical experiments
for the syndicate case. Therefore, incorporating the beneﬁts of renegotiation would add
relatively little to NPV at date 0. For example, including renegotiation gains would increase
the NPVs reported in Table 1 by about 2% of the required total investment of I0+I1 =1 0 0 . 18
17The entrepreneur could retain the upside if she could bypass the incumbent venture capitalist and go
directly to the syndicate for ﬁnancing. In practice the incumbent could block this end run by refusing to
participate in the syndicate. The syndicate would assume that the incumbent has inside information, and
would interpret the refusal to participate as bad news suﬃcient to deter their investment.
18We approximate renegotiation gains (holding αC∗
0 and x0 constant) by solving for (1) the value realization
164.3 Eﬀort and exercise at date 0
At date 0, the venture capitalist sets αC
0 and the entrepreneur decides how much eﬀort to
exert. Given αC












0 ) − g0(x0(α
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0 )))] (11)
The entrepreneur anticipates the syndicate’s share αS
1 as a function of date-1 value V1.F o r
ag i v e nαC
0 , date-1 syndicate ﬁnancing will result in less dilution of her share than in the
monopoly case, so she provides higher eﬀort at t = 0 as well as at t =1 .W ec a n n o te x p r e s s
NPV or eﬀort in closed form, so we compute them numerically.
The venture capitalist anticipates the entrepreneur’s reaction when he sets αC
0 .H e m u s t
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This constraint rarely binds, since at the margin there is almost always value added by
leaving positive value to the entrepreneur. Thus αC∗
0 is determined by
α
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0 ≥ 0, investment proceeds.
Typical results for syndicate ﬁnancing are shown in Table 1. Eﬀort and value increase
across the board, despite increases in the strike value V
S
1 from the monopoly case. We ﬁnd
that syndicate ﬁnancing dominates monopoly ﬁnancing with or without staged ﬁnancing.
Syndicate ﬁnancing is better ex ante for the initial venture capitalist and also increases overall
NPV. This is true for all parameter values, including values outside the range reported in
Table 1. Yet there are still value losses relative to the ﬁrst best.
4.4 The fully competitive case
Of course ﬁrst best is never attainable when the entrepreneur has to seek outside ﬁnancing.
Table 1 shows an alternative benchmark, the fully competitive case, in which all venture
capital investors, including the initial investor at date 1, receive NPV = 0. Fully competitive
ﬁnancing gives an upper bound on the overall NPV when the entrepreneur has no money
and has to share her marginal value added with outside investors. Solution procedures for
the fully competitive case are identical to the syndication case, except that αC
0 is set so that
NPVC
0 =0 .
Figure 8 shows date-1 ownership shares for the fully competitive case in the same format
as the syndication case in Figure 7. Two things stand out. First, the entrepreneur’s share
at which the venture capitalist will start to reduce his share; (2) the new strike value and (3) the integral
of NPV changes over this range. Only a small portion of the renegotiation gains come from more eﬃcient
continuation decisions (V
S
1(R) <V 1 < V
S
1). Most of the gains can be attributed to better eﬀort incentives
(higher x1) in the region where the project continues regardless (V1 > V
S
1). These gains further increase the
value advantages of syndicate ﬁnancing over monopoly ﬁnancing.
17is higher and the initial venture capitalist’s lower than in Figure 7, because competitive
ﬁnancing at date 0 gives relatively more shares to the entrepreneur. Both shares of course
increase with the realized value V1. Second, the strike value V 1 is lower in the competitive
case, primarily because the entrepreneur’s initial eﬀort is higher. Note also that the fully
competitive NPVs, which go entirely to the entrepreneur, are less than in the ﬁrst-best
case, because the entrepreneur’s eﬀort is lower. There is always some value loss when the
entrepreneur has to share the marginal value added by her eﬀort with outside investors.
4.5 Syndication with asymmetric information
So far we have assumed that the incoming syndicate investors and the incumbent venture
capitalist are equally informed. Now we consider asymmetric information between the in-
cumbent and new investors.
Both the incumbent and entrepreneur want the syndicate to perceive a high value V1.
The more optimistic the syndicate, the higher the ownership shares retained by the incum-
bent and entrepreneur. Reducing the syndicate’s share also increases the entrepreneur’s
eﬀort. Therefore, mere announcements of “great progress” or “high value” coming from the
entrepreneur or incumbent are not credible.
Credibility may come from the incumbent’s fractional participation in date-1 ﬁnancing.
Suppose the incumbent invests βI1 and the outside syndicate the rest. What participation
fraction β is consistent with truthful revelation of V1? If we could hold the entrepreneur’s
eﬀort constant, we could rely on Admati and Pﬂeiderer’s (1994) proof that β should be ﬁxed
at the incumbent investor’s ownership share at date 0, that is, at αC
0 .T h i s ﬁxed-fraction
rule would remove any incentive for the incumbent to over-report V1. ( T h em o r eh eo v e r -
reports, the more he has to overpay for his new shares. When β = αC
0 , the amount overpaid
cancels out any gain in the value of his existing shares.)19 The ﬁxed-fraction rule would also
insure optimal investment, since the incumbent’s share of date-1 investment exactly equals
his share of the ﬁnal payoﬀ V2. Admati and Pﬂeiderer also show that no other ﬁnancing rule
or procedure works in their setting.
Fixed-fraction ﬁnancing does not induce truthful information revelation in our model,
although a modiﬁed ﬁxed-fraction ﬁnancing works in some cases. The problem is the eﬀect
of the terms of date-1 ﬁnancing on the entrepreneur’s eﬀort. Suppose the incumbent investor
takes a fraction β = αC
0 of date-1 ﬁnancing and then reports a value ˆ V1 that is higher than the
true value V1. If the report is credible, the new shares are over-priced. The incumbent does
n o tg a i no rl o s ef r o mt h em i s p r i c i n g ,b e c a u s eβ = αC
0 , but the entrepreneur gains on his old
shares at the syndicate’s expense. Since the entrepreneur’s ownership share is higher than it
would be under a truthful report, she exerts more eﬀort, ﬁrm value increases, and both the
entrepreneur and incumbent are better oﬀ. Therefore the incumbent will over-report.
Am o d i ﬁed ﬁxed-fraction rule can work, however, provided that β is set above αC
0 and
eﬀort is not too sensitive to changes in the entrepreneur’s NPV at date 1. The required
diﬀerence between β and αC
0 depends on the responsiveness of the entrepreneur’s eﬀort to
19The ﬁxed-fraction rule would also remove any incentive to underreport. The more the incumbent under-
reports, the more he gains on the new shares. But the amount of proﬁt made on the new shares is exactly
oﬀset by losses incurred on existing shares.
18her ownership share. In many cases, a constant β set a few percentage points above αC
0
removes the incentive to overreport over a wide range of V1 realizations. But this rule may
break down as a general revelation mechanism in at least three ways.
First, when V1 is very low but exceeds V 1,w eﬁnd situations where the required β exceeds
1. This would make sense only if the new syndicate investors could short the company, so
we must constrain β < 1. This outcome is common in our numerical results, because the
incumbent’s initial share αC
0 is frequently above 85% - 90%, and in some of these cases the
entrepreneur’s eﬀort is very sensitive to the value of her stake in the ﬁrm. There is not
much room for β to increase between these starting points and a maximum level strictly less
than 1. When β hits the maximum, the modiﬁed ﬁx e df r a c t i o nr u l ef a ils to induce truthful
revelation.20
Second, the modiﬁed ﬁxed fraction rule also fails when V1 falls just below V 1.I nt h i sc a s e
the incumbent’s incentive to over-report becomes very strong, and only extremely high βs
can discipline the incumbent to tell the truth. This problem ﬂows from the discontinuity of
the entrepreneur’s eﬀo r ta tt h es t r i k ev a l u eV 1. Here the limit of β as V1 approaches V 1 from
below is inﬁnity and no ﬁxed-fraction rule works. This problem can be solved, however, if the
incumbent and the entrepreneur renegotiate their ownership shares when V1 falls between




1. If the incumbent venture capitalist
renegotiates, the lower strike value removes the discontinuity of eﬀort. As the incumbent’s
share declines, it is easier to ﬁnd a β < 1 that works. The required β approaches 0 as V1
approaches V
C
1 and the incumbent’s share approaches zero.
The third problem arises at high levels of V1. Setting β > αC
0 gives the incumbent
venture capitalist an incentive to under-report V1. The incumbent would gain more from
underpricing the new shares and buying them cheaply than he would lose from dilution of
his existing stake. Revelation works only if this incentive is oﬀset by the impact on the
entrepreneur’s eﬀort. But as V1 and ˆ V1 increase, eﬀort becomes higher and less sensitive to
the terms of ﬁnancing. As eﬀort tops out, the incentive to under-report takes over. This
could be prevented locally by allowing β to decrease with ˆ V1, returning to β = αC
0 at very high
values. But then the almost-ﬁxed fraction rule fails globally to induce truthful information
revelation, because at lower V1 realizations he wants to over-report to these higher levels at
which β = αC
0 .
One possible solution, not fully explored here, is to introduce more complex contracts
that allow signalling along two dimensions. For example, the incentive for the incumbent
venture capitalist to under-report at high levels of V1 could be oﬀset by an incentive contract
that grants the entrepreneur extra shares if the incumbent reports very high project value.
With this additional provision in place, it should be possible to allow β to decrease with ˆ V1,
reaching β = αC
0 at high values of V1.T h i sc o u l db eo n ej u s t i ﬁcation for contingent share
awards to the entrepreneurs, as observed in Kaplan and Stromberg (2003). Alternatively,
the entrepreneur could be granted a series of stock options with increasing exercise prices,
so that the entrepreneur’s ﬁnal ownership share increases at high values of V2.
20This failure is less frequent if the entrepreneur has some personal wealth and can co-invest with the
venture capitalist at date 0. The coinvestment reduces the venture capitalist’s ownership share and provides
more room for β to increase to a maximum level strictly less than 1.
19When the modiﬁed ﬁxed fraction rule fails, the syndicate investors face the asymmetric
information problem analyzed by Myers and Majluf (1984). In the special case of their model
that is closest to our problem here, the ﬁrm has no assets in place (no value in liquidation),
so it goes ahead with ﬁnancing on terms ﬁxed by the new investors’ knowledge of the average
value of V1. Syndicate investors would have to infer the average V1 from conditions at date
0, the entrepreneur’s eﬀort functions and the entrepreneur’s and incumbent’s decision rules,
given the anticipated terms of date-1 ﬁnancing. But the investors do not know the true
value V1, so their new ﬁnancing is overpriced when V1 is low and underpriced when V1 is
high. This leads to more eﬀort when V1 is low and less when it is high, compared to the
full-revelation case. But again there are problems. For example, if V1 is high, the incumbent
will be better oﬀ cancelling syndicate ﬁnancing and providing the date-1 money directly.
But if this is allowed, then the incumbent will have an incentive to claim a high value V1 in
order to reclaim monopoly power over the terms of ﬁnancing. In addition, if the syndicate
investors know less than the incumbent and the incumbent is free to ﬁnance the investment
from his own pocket, then the incumbent will only raise syndicate ﬁnancing if the syndicate
is paying too much. Therefore a rational syndicate will not invest.21
Even if the revelation mechanism fails, there may be other ways to convey V1.T h e
value of the incumbent investor’s reputation could generate truthful reports in a repeated
game setting, for example. The syndicate usually includes other venture capitalists that the
incumbent has worked with in the past ande x p e c t st ow o r kw i t hi nt h ef u t u r e .
5 Summary of Numerical Results
Table 1 illustrates our main results. It shows surprisingly large value losses in most cases,
relative to ﬁrst-best. (For now ignore the debt-ﬁnancing entries.) Value losses are greatest
in the monopoly case where the initial venture capitalist provides all ﬁnancing and dictates
the terms of ﬁnancing at date 1 as well as date 0. This does not imply that the venture
capitalist extracts all value, leaving the entrepreneur with zero NPV. The venture capitalist
wants to preserve the entrepreneur’s incentives to some extent. Nevertheless, the ﬁnancing
terms that maximize value for the venture capitalist usually leave the entrepreneur with a
small minority slice of a diminished pie.
The problem with staged ﬁnancing is that a monopolistic venture capitalist cannot com-
mit not to hold up the entrepreneur ex post. Thus NPV can be higher and the initial venture
capitalist better oﬀ if staged ﬁnancing is abandoned and all ﬁnancing is committed at date
0. Complete upfront ﬁnancing is superior for all eﬀort parameters (all values of θr = θf/θg)
when option value is relatively low, as it is for most of the range of standard deviations
in Figure 5. Figure 6 shows that when the option value is high, staged ﬁnancing is more
eﬃcient, despite the monopoly holdup problem.
Syndication of date-1 ﬁnancing always makes both the entrepreneur and the initial ven-
ture capitalist better oﬀ as long as the syndicate’s ﬁnancing terms are reasonably competi-
tive. This key result of our paper is evident in Table 1 and also holds generally. We believe
that our syndicate case, in which the initial venture capitalist can set ﬁnancing terms at
date 0 but not date 1, is a good match to actual venture capital contracting. Of course we
21This is a variation of Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking-order proofs.
20observe syndication in practice, but that observation does not settle whether the terms of
syndicate ﬁnancing are competitive (NPV = 0) or monopolistic. Our analysis indicates that
syndication terms are reasonably competitive. With monopoly ﬁnancing terms at date 1,
we ﬁnd that the entrepreneur’s ﬁnal ownership share is a decreasing function of ﬁrm value.
With competitive terms, as in our syndication case, the entrepreneur’s share is an increasing
function of value, consistent with practice (Kaplan and Stromberg (2003)).
The syndicate case is still ineﬃcient, because it gives the initial venture capitalist the
bargaining power to set ﬁnancing terms at date 0. We believe that venture capitalists do have
bargaining power and receive at least some (quasi) rents in early ﬁnancing rounds. They have
bargaining power because of experience and expertise, because of the ﬁxed costs of setting up
a venture capital partnership and because of the cost and delay that the entrepreneur would
absorb in looking for another venture-capital investor. But there are obviously eﬃciency
improvements if and as the terms of date-0 ﬁnancing become more competitive. The fully
competitive case shows the limit where the initial venture capitalist has no special bargaining
power and just receives NPV = 0. Even the fully competitive case falls short of ﬁrst best,
however. The entrepreneur’s eﬀort falls whenever outside ﬁnancing has to be raised, because
the entrepreneur bears the full cost of eﬀort, but has to share the marginal value added by
eﬀort with the outside investors.
Figure 9 summarizes value losses for the monopoly, no-staging, syndication and fully
competitive cases over a wide range of the eﬀort parameter θr. Value loss is deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between NPV at date 0 and ﬁrst-best NPV. The four panels correspond to panels
A to D in Figure 1, except for the variation in θr. F i g u r e1 0r e p e a t sF i g u r e9f o ram o r e
proﬁtable startup with V0 =2 0 0 .
The value losses plotted in Figure 9 increase rapidly with θr when θr is below 1.0, but
the losses are always less in the syndication case than in the monopoly cases. The losses
in the syndicate case still appear economically signiﬁcant, however. The only situations in
which losses do not appear signiﬁcant occur in the fully competitive case when θr is above
2.0. High values for θr mean that eﬀort generates value at relatively little cost, so that the
entrepreneur is willing to expend close to ﬁrst-best eﬀort in the fully competitive case, even
though the marginal beneﬁto fe ﬀort is shared with outside investors.
Value losses in the monopoly, no staging case increase as standard deviation is increased
from σ =0 .4t o0 .8. This is as expected, since staged ﬁnancing is more valuable as volatility
increases. But value losses may also increase with standard deviation in the monopoly and
syndication cases, at least for the region where θr is about 1.0 and higher. We found this sur-
prising. Our original intuition was that increased uncertainty would enhance the optionality
of investment and mitigate incentive problems. Instead it can make these problems worse,
because more uncertainty can lead to lower initial eﬀort.22 Compare the bottom-left and
bottom-right panels in Figure 9, for example. The eﬀects of volatility on eﬀort and value
can also be seen in panels E and F of Table 1. In the syndicate case, the value loss in panel
22When overall NPV is near zero, the entrepreneur’s eﬀort x0 increases rapidly with σ. The more un-
certainty, the greater chance that the entrepreneur’s call option will be in the money and the greater the
marginal reward to eﬀort. But as θr increases and NPV rises, eﬀort eventually declines as σ increases,
because the marginal impact of eﬀort is less. The diﬀerence can be traced to the slope of the cumulative
lognormal, which is lower at the mean when σ is high.
21E, with σ =0 .4, is 10.98 - 1.55 = 9.43. In panel F, with σ =0 .8, value loss is 27.72 - 17.50
= 10.22. Initial eﬀort falls from x0 =3 .05 in panel E to x0 =2 .80 in panel F.
The value-loss patterns in Figure 9 are repeated in Figure 10, where V0 = 200 rather
than 150. Financing is feasible in Figure 10 at lower levels of the eﬀort parameter θr.V a l u e
losses are lower for the fully competitive case, but actually increase for the monopoly and
syndication cases. This problem can be traced to the initial venture capitalist’s bargaining
power at date 0. Consider the monopoly case. Since the marginal product of eﬀort is higher
when V0 =2 0 0 , the entrepreneur will put in more eﬀort at date 1. This allows the initial
venture capitalist to tighten the screws and extract a greater ownership share, which in turn
feeds back to lower eﬀo r tb yt h ee n t r e p r e n e u ra td a t e0 .
The eﬀects of other parameters on our results are generally as expected. NPV increases
when the ratio θr = θf/θg increases. The strike value V falls with θr, increasing the proba-
bility that the date-1 option to invest is in the money, and when the option is in the money
it is worth more. Overall NPV increases when σ increases (generating more uncertainty in
V1 and V2) and when a greater fraction of investment can be deferred to date 1. These eﬀects
are natural for investments in real options.
6D e b t ﬁnancing
So far we have considered only equity ﬁnancing, following venture-capital practice. Is equity
ﬁnancing eﬃcient for venture capitalists? We cannot answer this question without deriving
optimal contracts, a task that we do not attempt in this paper. But it is interesting to
consider the alternative of debt ﬁnancing. We have interpreted syndicate ﬁnancing as a
device to secure the entrepreneur’s eﬀort by protecting her from ex-post holdup. Could a
switch to debt ﬁnancing achieve the same or better result? In traditional agency models,
debt ﬁnancing calls forth maximum eﬀort, because the entrepreneur retains the maximum
fraction of the value added at the margin by her eﬀort. Perhaps we have oversimpliﬁed
venture-capital practice to the extent that debt dominates equity as a ﬁnancing contract.
In this section we show that debt is not superior to equity. When eﬀort and investment
are made in stages, debt ﬁnancing can actually amplify the hold-up problem and reduce
the entrepreneur’s initial eﬀort at date 0. We will show that debt ﬁnancing could increase
eﬃciency in some cases, however.
Suppose that the startup ﬁrm issues debt rather than equity to venture-capital investors.
The face value of the debt equals the required investment. Of course, this debt faces a high
probability of default, so the promised payoﬀ at date 2, including interest, is well above face
value. (Safe debt is nearly impossible, given the high variance of most startups and most
entrepreneurs’ limited funds available for equity investment.) The promised debt payoﬀ
(face value plus interest) sets a strike value for V2 below which the startupd e f a u l t sa n dt h e
investors receive all of the startup’s payoﬀ P. Above this point the investors’ payoﬀ is capped
and the entrepreneur receives the residual. Thus debt ﬁnancing converts the entrepreneur’s
stake to a call option, and our discussion of debt ﬁnancing also applies if the entrepreneur
receives no shares but only options. The implicit call options created by debt ﬁnancing
would probably be out of the money, however, because the promised payment to the venture
22capitalists would have to exceed total investment by enough to cover the risk of failure and
default.
Now we revisit the monopoly case, holding all aspects of our model constant, except that
at date 1 the venture capitalist and entrepreneur negotiate a promised debt payoﬀ K1 instead
of ownership shares αC
1 and αM
1 . (With debt, αM
1 = 1.) The entrepreneur’s NPV at date 1
i sh e re x p e c t e dr e s i d u a lp a y o u ta td a t e2 ,t h a ti s ,E0[max(0,f 0f1V2 − K1)]. As before, the
entrepreneur chooses eﬀort to maximize NPVM
1 , and the venture capitalist chooses K∗
1 to
maximize NPVC
1 . The startup continues if NPVC
1 >I 1. At date 0, the entrepreneur antic-
ipates K∗
1 and chooses initial eﬀort accordingly. We solve numerically for the entrepreneur’s
eﬀort, the promised payoﬀ K∗
1 and the venture capitalist’s and entrepreneur’s NPVs. If both
parties’ participation constraints are met at date 0, the venture is launched.
Table 1 shows examples comparing debt versus equity ﬁnancing in the monopoly case.
It is immediately clear that debt is no panacea. When monopoly debt ﬁnancing is feasible,
it can enhance eﬀort and NPV. In Panels B and D of Table 1, for example, initial eﬀort is
higher and NPVs increase in the monopoly (debt) cases. The resulting NPVs in these cases
approach the fully competitive outcome. But in Panels A, C and F startups that could be
ﬁnanced by a monopolist venture capitalist with equity cannot be ﬁnanced with debt. This
breakdown occurs because debt makes the holdup problem worse. At date 1, the venture
capitalist is able to set the promised debt payoﬀ so high that the entrepreneur is left with
with a very small slice of value. The entrepreneur’s eﬀo r ta td a t e1i si n c r e a s e d ,g i v e nK∗
1,
because the entrepreneur holds an option and receives all value in excess of K∗
1.B u t t h e
entrepreneur’s date-1 NPV is very small, and her eﬀort at date 0 is drastically reduced. It
appears that linear equity contracts between the entrepreneur and venture capitalist mitigate
the hold-up problem at date 1 and generate more eﬃcient eﬀo r ta td a t e0 .
In the syndicate ﬁnancing case, the venture capitalist negotiates an initial debt level KC
0
at date 0 in exchange for initial funding. At date 1, if V1 is large enough, new, pari passu
debt with face value KS
1 is issued to a syndicate of investors for zero expected return. The
incumbent venture capitalist and syndicate share in debt payouts at date 2 according to their










1 . The entrepreneur makes the same decisions
as in the monopolistic case, but faces the combined debt level KC
0 + KS
1 .A s b e f o r e , t h e
syndicate provides date-1 ﬁnancing on competitive terms.
Introducing debt contracts in the syndication case increases the entrepreneur’s initial
eﬀort, but also increases V , the threshold for project continuation. Higher eﬀort increases
NPV and higher V reduces it. If the ﬁrst (second) eﬀect outweighs the second (ﬁrst), then
syndicated debt yields higher (lower) NPV. In Panels A to D and F of Table 1, overall NPV
falls when ﬁnancing is syndicated and debt is substituted for equity. Note the high values
for V i nP a n e l sAt oDa n dF .P a n e lEi sa ne x c e p t i o n ,w h e r es y n d i c a t eﬁnancing is feasible
with debt but not with equity.
Syndication in the debt ﬁnancing case reduces the initial venture capitalist’s ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility. Since the syndicate does not allow the initial venture capitalist to hold up the
entrepreneur ex post, he sets the face value of his own date-0 debt higher in order to extract
as much upside as possible. This creates a debt overhang, which translates in turn to higher
23strike values (higher V s) and to lower NPV.
According to Table 1, the initial venture capitalist should abandon syndication and switch
to monopoly debt ﬁnancing if faced with the parameter values in panels B and D. Why
is syndicate debt ﬁnancing not better than monopoly debt ﬁnancing? Syndicated debt
should eliminate holdup problems at date 1. One answer is that Table 1 does not include
potential gains from renegotiation at date 1 before syndicate ﬁnancing is raised. We discussed
renegotiation for the syndicated equity case, but left it out of our calculations. Opportunities
for renegotiation are rare with equity ﬁnancing, and syndicated equity is more eﬃcient than
monopoly equity even when potential gains from renegotiation are ignored. With syndicated
debt, opportunities for renegotiation are much more common, because of the high strike
values created by the initial venture capitalist’s debt holdings, and potential value gains
much larger.
Other things equal, including the date-1 strike value V 1, ﬁnancing on competitive rather
than monopolistic terms at date 1 must improve eﬀo r ta n de xa n t eN P V .B u ti ti sn o tc l e a r
whether renegotiation is a reliable mechanism to reduce the high strike values that we have
calculated for the debt syndication case. Frequent opportunities for renegotiation may also
mean frequent opportunities for the incumbent venture capitalist to reassert his monopoly
power. The incumbent could force renegotiation even when the startup is performing well
and V1 > V 1. The syndicate investors, who are unlikely to be fully informed about V1,h a v e
no particular reason to object to renegotiation, since their investment is zero-NPV in any
case. These issues, which we leave as a topic for further research, are probably second-order
with equity ﬁnancing, because opportunities to add value by renegotiation are rare and only
occur at low values of V1, for example in down rounds. These issues may be much more
serious with syndicated debt ﬁnancing.
The syndication results in Table 1 may shed some light on why venture capitalists choose
to hold equity when later-stage ﬁnancing is syndicated. In Panels A through D and F,
syndicate ﬁnancing with equity rather than debt increases both overall NPV and the NPV
to the original venture capitalist. Hence, if the choice of ﬁnancing can be dictated by the
venture capitalist at time 0, then he would maximize his NPV by oﬀering equity ﬁnancing
to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur does better with debt, but cannot bribe the venture
capitalist to change to debt. Even if the entrepreneur had independent wealth to ﬁnance
ab r i b e ,n od e a lc o u l db es t r u c k ,b e c a u s et h e change from equity to debt would decrease
overall value. Panel E is the exception where a switch from equity to debt would make both
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist better oﬀ.23
We summarize our ﬁndings on debt versus equity in venture capital as follows. First,
debt does not eliminate the holdup problem when incumbent venture capitalists can dictate
the terms of later-stage ﬁnancing. Second, debt ﬁnancing is not generally more eﬃcient than
23We have not explored diﬀerences between debt and equity over all possible parameter values. Thus we
cannot rule out cases where a switch from equity to debt in the syndication case increases overall NPV at
the venture capitalist’s expense. In such cases the entrepreneur could compensate the venture capitalist for
the switch, providing she has suﬃcient wealth. If her wealth is not suﬃcient, the alternative is to oﬀer the
venture capitalist some extra shares, options or warrants at date 1. But then we have a mix of debt and
equity ﬁnancing, which would aﬀect eﬀort and value. For the use of equity securities in debt renegotiation,
see Kalay and Zender (1997) and Bhattacharya and Faure-Grimaud (2001).
24equity. Even in the fully competitive case, switching from equity to debt sometimes adds
value (in Panels C, E and F of Table 1) and sometimes reduces value (Panels A, B and D).
Third, debt ﬁnancing for high-risk startups is equivalent to compensating the entrepreneur
exclusively with options rather than shares. We think that the most eﬃcient contract will be
a mixture of shares and options for the entrepreneur — or equivalently, a combination of an
initial share award plus additional shares conditional on high realized value for the startup.
Kaplan and Str¨ omberg (2003) document such contingent payoﬀsi np r a c t i c e . 24
Contingent compensation for the entrepreneur should also help reveal the startup’s value
to potential syndicate investors. Recall our discussion of the modiﬁed ﬁxed-fraction rule,
in which the incumbent venture capitalist’s participation in date-1 ﬁnancing can negate his
incentive to over-report the value of the startup. We noted that that options or contingent
share awards to the entrepreneur may be necessary to prevent a breakdown of revelation at
high values of V1.
An investigation of optimal contracts for venture capital will have to address (1) the mix
of shares, options or other securities given to the entrepreneur and venture capitalists, (2)
bargaining and renegotiation between incumbent venture capitalists and the entrepreneur
before additional ﬁnancing is raised and (3) information revelation. We believe that these
three issues are interconnected. We leave them for further research.
7 Conclusions
As far as we know, this paper is the ﬁrst to combine the main features of venture-capital
contracting in a consistent formal model. As we expected, the model has no closed-form
solution, except in the ﬁrst-best case, so we embarked on an experiment in computational
corporate ﬁnance. We show how multiple contractual provisions that are common in ven-
ture capital contracts aﬀect the moral hazard, eﬀort provision, asymmetric information and
holdup problems in the entrepreneur-venture capital relationship. Venture capital contract-
ing does not solve these problems indvidually but trades them oﬀ. For example, staged
ﬁnancing induces more eﬃcient investment decisions in later stages but creates a potential
holdup problem. A commitment to later stage syndication can alleviate the holdup problem
between the entrepreneur and the initial venture capitalist but introduces information rev-
elation problems between the incumbent venture capitalist and members of the later stage
syndicate.
Venture capital ﬁnancing comes with eﬃciency losses. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant underinvest-
ment: many positive NPV-projects cannot be ﬁnanced. For projects that can be ﬁnanced,
there can be large value losses due to under-provision of eﬀort, even for relatively small eﬀort
costs. A commitment to syndicate ﬁnancing in later stages reduces the entrepreneur’s un-
derprovision of eﬀort, increasing overall eﬃciency. Syndication increases the NPVs of both
the entrepreneur and the initial venture capitalist. The venture capitalist’s proﬁts increase
despite taking a smaller share than in the monopoly case.
Syndicate ﬁnancing is most eﬀective when the incumbent venture capitalist’s inside in-
24Contingent payoﬀs are implicit in our model, at least in the syndication and the fully competitive cases,
because the entrepreneur’s share of the ﬁrm increases as date-1 value increases. See Figures 7 and 8.
25formation is revealed through his participation in ﬁnancing. However, the ﬁxed-fraction
participation rule derived by Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1994) does not work as a revelation
mechanism in our model, because the terms of ﬁnancing aﬀect the entrepreneur’s eﬀort. A
modiﬁed ﬁxed-fraction rule, in which the incumbent’s fractional participation increases as
the reported value increases, can work in some cases. We suggest that a combination of
the modiﬁed rule with additional contingent share awards to the entrepreneur should work
generally, although a full analysis of asymmetric information and revelation will remain a
topic for further research.
The startups that venture capitalists invest in are compound call options. Therefore
we expected strong option-like behavior, for example a strong dependence of strike values
and NPVs on the variance of ﬁnal payoﬀs. But this expected behavior was attenuated or
overridden by agency and incentive problems. We noted how increased uncertainty dampens
the entrepreneur’s eﬀort, for example. This feedback is not a result of risk aversion, because
the entrepreneur is assumed risk-neutral. It arises because increased uncertainty reduces the
marginal value added by eﬀort when potential value is suﬃciently high.
The option-like properties of venture capital investments are also attenuated because
ﬁnancing is feasible only for startups that are well in the money, from a purely ﬁnancial
point of view. They have to be well in the money to overcome incentive problems and costs
of eﬀort. That is why all the numerical results presented in this paper assume expected
potential value of V0 = 150 or 200, versus total investment of only 100. Even with these
prospects, ﬁnancing may not be feasible, even with competitive syndicate ﬁnancing. Note
the negative NPVs in panel E of Table 1, for example.
Of course numerical results are never conclusive. One can never rule out the possibility
that results would have been diﬀerent with diﬀerent inputs or modeling choices. But we
veriﬁed our results over a wide range of inputs. Our model, though simpliﬁed, follows actual
practice in venture capital. Once we simpliﬁed, our only judgment calls were the choices of
the lognormal distribution for the startup’s value and of exponential functions for the value
added and cost of eﬀort. We believe these assumptions are reasonable, but further research
could explore alternatives.
8 Appendix
8.1 Appendix 1. Solving the optimization problems.
8.1.1 First-best.
Date 1: The entrepreneur’s date-1 NPV is
NPV
M
1 =m a x [ 0 ,max
x1 (E1P(x1) − g1(x1) − I1)] (14)














26letting θ = θf + θg, θr = θf/θg. Substituting f∗
1 and g∗
1 into (14) yields
NPV
M
1 =m a x [ 0 ,f 0V1 −   θ(f0V1)
θg/θ − I1]( 1 6 )





Investment procedes when NPVM
1 ≥ 0. Let V 1 be such that NPVM
1 (V 1)=0 . T h e n
V 1 is calculated numerically from
I1 = f0V 1 −   θ(f0V 1)
θg/θ (17)
Date 0: The entrepreneur’s date-0 NPV is the diﬀerence between her expected date-1
NPV and the t = 0 costs of investment and eﬀort:
NPV
M
0 =m a x [ 0 ,max
x0 (E0NPV
M
1 (x0) − g0(x0) − I0)] (18)
The NPV expectation is taken by weighting each possible NPVM
1 realization (Eq. (16))

















where Π(V ) is the lognormal density. Since NPVM
1 (x0,V 1(x0)) = 0, the entrepreneur’s





















































where µ = E(lnV ), σ2 = Va r(lnV ), and N(0,1) is the standard normal cdf. Using this































letting φ = 1
σ ln V0
V1. We solve numerically for x 
0 since φ = φ(V 1(x 
0)). A calculation whether
NPVM
0 (x 
0) ≥ 0 determines whether the initial I0 + g0 investment will be made.
278.1.2 Monopolist case.
Date 1: The entrepreneur’s date-1 eﬀort and NPV are similar to Eqs. (14)-(16). Firm
value is multiplied by the entrepreneur’s share of the project αM
1 =1−αC
1 and I1 drops out










1 E1P(x1) − g1(x1)
 


























The venture capitalist chooses αC 
1 to maximize his date 1 NPV, equal to his share of
the ﬁrm value decreased by time 1 investment costs. Plugging in f 
1 from (24) yields
NPV
C








































The venture capitalist operates subject to the entrepreneur’s participation constraint of
NPVM
1 (αC
1 ) ≥ 0. The maximum αC
1 share he can take is obtained by setting the last term
in (25) equal to zero. This yields
α
C
1 (max) = 1 − α
M




the limit point for αC
1 in (26). The unconstrained ﬁrst-order condition for αC
1 is:
(θrf0V1)



















, the venture capitalist chooses the unconstrained value; if not, he
assigns αC
1 (max).25
However, in most parameterizations the constraint never binds. That is, V1, the con-
tinuation point, is typically high enough that the entrepreneur’s participation constraint is
always slack. For large V1, αC 
1 grows more slowly than αC
1 (max), so it is only for small V 1
25This follows because NPVC
1 is concave in αC
1 . αM
1 (min) may be greater than 1 if f0 is small or the V1
realization is low. Liquidation would ensue.
28(which result from small I1) that the constraint may bind. For realistic parameterizations,
the entrepreneur enjoys positive NPV everywhere past (and including) V 1.26
Since the venture capitalist typically hits his participation constraint ﬁrst, his NPV
determines V 1. We compute V
C
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Investment occurs if V1 > V
C
1 .
Date 1: The entrepreneur’s date 0 value is
NPV
M
0 =m a x [ 0 ,max
x0 (E0NPV
M
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To compute (NPVM
1 (x0)) , we need the formula for
∂αC 
1
∂x0 or αC  
1 . Using the implicit

















26One can look at the entrepreneur’s positive NPV intuitively or mathematically. Intuitively, the venture
capitialist is better oﬀ when the entrepreneur has a higher incentive to provide eﬀort. αC
1 (max) is generally
very high, and venture capitalist does better by taking a smaller than maximum share.
Mathematically, the continuation point V 1 is determined by the venture capitalist’s NPV because of the
additive investment cost function. Since I1 does not aﬀect FOCC
1 or FOCM
1 ,b ya l t e r i n gI1 one alters the
venture capitalist’s proﬁtability without changing the optimal αCT
1 and the entrepreneur’s proﬁtability. Rea-
sonable I1 is high enough to make the venture capitalist’s NPV surpass 0 without causing the entrepreneur’s
to fall below 0.
29Deriving entrepreneur value (Eq. (25)) with respect to initial eﬀort, taking its expectation
over all possible V1 realizations from V
C












































The middle term in Eq. (34) is evaluated as follows. NPVM
















is taken from the lognormal
distribution. For V
C 
1 , the implicit function theorem on Eq. (31) and αC  












We solve numerically for x 
0 from Eq. (34). We evaluate the integrals point-by-point,
ending the summation at 6 times the standard deviation of V1.G i v e n x∗
0, and assuming
that the entrepreneur wants to continue, i.e. NPVM
0 (x∗
0) > 0, the venture capitalist decides
whether to invest. His option is worth
NPV
C










































0 > 0 the venture capitalist will provide funding.
8.1.3 Monopolist case, no staging.
Date 1: The entrepreneur’s date-1 NPV and eﬀort is determined as in Eqs. (23-24) except
that αM
1 , the manager’s date 1 project share, has already been negotiated and set at date 0.
Denoting this as αM
1 = αM 
0 ,t h em a n a g e r ’ sd a t e - 1NPV simpliﬁes to
NPV
M










Because all funding (I0 +I1) has been supplied upfront, the venture capitalist no longer has
any decisions to make at t = 1. The entrepreneur now makes the continuation decision, so
that V1, the continuation point, is found by setting NPVM








1 = αC 
















1 − αC 
0
  −θf/θ




30Date 0: At date 0, the venture capitalist decides his ultimate project share αC∗
0 and
the entrepreneur decides how much eﬀort to exert. For a given αC
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The expectation of the entrepreneur’s date-1 NPV is found by weighting (40) over possible
V1 realizations. Again letting αM
1 = αM































































































letting φ = 1
σ ln V0
V 1M. Again we solve numerically for x 
0.
The venture capitalist anticipates x 
0(αC
0 )w h e nh es e t sαC







,w h e r eαC













0 (max))) = 0 (47)
This constraint rarely binds, and αC∗
0 will be chosen to maximize
NPV
C














0 ) − I0 − I1
 
(48)
Taking the expectation of (42) and using x 
0 from the entrepreneur’s maximization and the
















Π(V )Vd V (49)
−α
C

















































.W e s o l v e f o r αC∗
0 numerically, since
f0 = f0(x 
0(αC
0 )). If NPVC
0 ≥ 0 investment will proceed.
8.1.4 Syndicate case.
Date 1: At date 1, for a given share αM
1 , the entrepreneur’s NPV and maximization





1) exactly as in Eq.s
(23)-(25), but where αM
1 = αM
0 (1 − αS
1). The share given to the outside syndicate, αS
1,i s
determined by setting NPVS





















after substituting f 
1. This is solved numerically for αS
1.
We solve for V 1 using the same procedure as in the monopolistic venture capitalist sce-
nario. As previously, V 1 may imply that NPVM
1 (V 1) > 0o rt h a tNPVM
1 (V 1)=0 . A g a i n ,
for realistic values of I1 the entrepreneur’s participation constraint is always slack. There-
fore we identify V 1 by ﬁnding the point where the maximum value to the syndicate is zero.
At this point the value of αS
1 implied by the syndicate’s zero-proﬁt condition (51) is equal





















































































  1+θ/θf (54)
Using FOCS


























  2 (55)
These two expressions are nearly identical toE q . s( 3 1 )a n d( 3 2 ) ,p e r t a i n i n gt ot h em o -
nopolistic venture capitalist’s breakeven point. The sole diﬀerence in the expressions is the
presence of αM
0 , the entrepreneur’s initial project share, on the left-hand side of Eq. (54).
27In general there will be two solutions to the zero-proﬁte q u a t i o n ,αS
1 and αS
1. αS
1 is the maximum
s h a r ew h i c hc a nb eg i v e nt ot h es y n d i c a t ea n ds t i l lr e t u r nNPVS =0 ;αS




1), the syndicate enjoys positive expected proﬁts (indeed these two values can be thought of
as bounds for the proﬁt-maximizing share). When V1 = V 1,t h e nαS
1 = αST
1 = αS










, implying a higher V
S
1 than in the monopolistic venture capitalist sce-
nario. Investment at date 1 occurs for V1 > V
S
1.
Date 0: At date 0, the venture capitalist decides his project share αC∗
0 and the en-
trepreneur decides how much eﬀo r tt oe x e r t . F o rag i v e nαC
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Using the solutions for f 
1,g  
1, and αS






























We solve for x 
0(αC
0 ) numerically, exactly as in the monopolistic venture capitalist case, only
using the lower αS
1 share in the entrepreneur’s NPV term.
The venture capitalist anticipates x 
0(αC
0 )w h e nh es e t sαC







,w h e r eαC













0 (max))) = 0 (58)
This constraint rarely binds, and αC∗
0 will be chosen to maximize
NPV
C














0 ) − I0
 
(59)
Using the solutions for f 
1,g  
1, and αS
1 from Eq.s (24) and (51), and x 








































We solve for αC∗
0 numerically, again evaluating the integrals point-by-point, ending the sum-
mation at 6 standard deviations of V1.I f NPVC
0 ≥ 0 investment will proceed.
8.2 Appendix 2. Syndicate Financing: Asymmetric Information.
8.2.1 The Case of no eﬀort at t =1 .
Consider a project where there is no date 1 eﬀort, only the I1 cost. In expectation the
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To make the capitalist indiﬀerent between telling the truth and lying about V1, we take









or, using ˆ αS














The only solution is β = αC
0 . Similarly, we can derive the solution when I1 can vary (for
instance if I1 inﬂuences the probability of favorable V2 realizations).
8.2.2 The Case of t =1eﬀort by the entrepreneur.






























































Enforcing ˆ V1 = V1 and using αS




































34First we note that if the eﬀo r td i dn o tc h a n g ew i t hV1, the right-hand side would equal
zero requiring again that αC
1 = αC
0 or β = αC
0 . However when
∂f1
∂ ˆ V1 > 0, αC
1 must be greater
than αC
0 in order to prevent overreporting of V1. The gap between αC
1 and αC
0 is responsible
for the under-reporting motive, because for high V1 realizations the venture capitalist can
increase his share of the project, relative to αC
0 ,o na nNPV >0b a s i s .
8.3 Appendix 3:
8.3.1 Monopolist debt ﬁnancing.
Date-2: The ﬁnal payouts in the debt ﬁnancing case are options on ﬁnal ﬁrm value:
NPVM
2 =m a x ( 0 ,f 0f1V2 − K1)
NPVC
2 = f0f1V2 − max(0,f 0f1V2 − K1) (72)





Date-1: The entrepreneur’s date-1 eﬀort and NPV must be solved for numerically with
debt ﬁnancing. The entrepreneur’s NPV is the probability weighted expectation of her t =2






Π(V )f1(x1)Vd V − K1
∞  
V 2(x1)
Π(V )dV − g1(x1)( 7 4 )
Change of variables on the lognormal establishes that
NPV
M
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where N(0,1) is standard normal cdf and φ = 1
σ ln V1
V 2. We solve numerically for x 
1 since
φ = φ(V 2(x 
1)).
The venture capitalist chooses K 
1 to maximize his date 1 NPV, anticipating f 
1(K1)

























As before, the venture capitalist operates subject to the entrepreneur’s participation
constraint of NPVM
1 (K1) ≥ 0. The maximum K1 level he can take is obtained numerically,
as is K 
1.I f K 
1 ∈ [0,K 1(max)], the venture capitalist chooses the unconstrained value; if
not, he assigns K1(max).
S i n c ew ei m p o s et h a tNPVM
1 (K1) ≥ 0, we solve for the continuation point V
C
1 by setting
the venture capitalist’s maximized NPV from (76) to zero. Investment occurs if V1 > V
C
1 .
35Date-0: The entrepreneur’s date 0 value is
NPV
M
0 =m a x [ 0 ,max
x0 (E0NPV
M







































Recall that each V1 realization implies K 
1(V1), f 




0 numerically, evaluating the integrals point-by-point, ending the summation at 6 times
the standard deviation of V1.
Given x∗
0, and assuming that the entrepreneur wants to continue, i.e. NPVM
0 (x∗
0) > 0,
the venture capitalist decides whether to invest. His option is worth
NPV
C














































0 > 0 the venture capitalist will provide funding.
8.3.2 Debt ﬁnancing with date-1 syndication.
Date-2: At t = 1 a syndicate of investors provides I1, purchasing a pari passu debt issuance
on competitive terms. Denoting this debt level as KS
1 ,a n dd e ﬁning K as the total debt due
or K = KC
0 + KS
1 , ﬁnal payouts are
NPVM





K f0f1V2 − max(0,
KC
0






K f0f1V2 − max(0,
KS
1













At date 1, for a given combined debt level K, the entrepreneur’s NPV and maximization




1 (K)f r o mE q .
(75), but using K = KC
0 + KS
1 rather than K 
1.
The face value of debt issued to the outside syndicate is determined by setting NPVS
1



























































1(K) from the entrepreneur’s maximization, this is solved numerically for KS
1 .
We solve for V 1 using the same procedure as in the monopolistic venture capitalist sce-
nario, ﬁnding the point where the maximum value to the syndicate is zero. There are two
diﬀerences in the syndicate’s and monopolistic venture capitalist’s maximization problem,
both stemming from the incumbent venture capitalist’s outstanding debt level. First, the
debt default point, V
S
2,i sh i g h e rb yKC
0 . Second, the presence of
KS
1
K , the syndicate’s share
of total debt, reduces the syndicate’s share of ﬁrm value when debt defaults. Both imply a
higher V
S
1 than in the monopolistic venture capitalist scenario. Investment at date 1 occurs




At date 0, the venture capitalist decides his debt level KC∗
0 and the entrepreneur decides
how much eﬀo r tt oe x e r t . F o rag i v e nKC





































































Each V1 realization implies K(V1), f 
1(K(V1)), and φ(V 2(K,f 
1)). We solve for x 
0(KC
0 )
numerically, exactly as in the monopolistic venture capitalist case, but using the combined
debt level K = KC
0 + KS
1 .
The venture capitalist anticipates x 
0(KC
0 )w h e nh es e t sKC







,w h e r eKC













0 (max))) = 0 (88)
37This constraint rarely binds, and KC∗
0 is chosen to maximize
NPV
C












0 ) − I0]( 8 9 )
Using x 














































We solve for KC∗
0 numerically, again evaluating the integrals point-by-point, ending the
summation at 6 standard deviations of V1.I f NPVC
0 ≥ 0 investment will proceed.
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429T a b l e s a n d F i g u r e s
Table 1. Example of numerical results for nine cases: (1) No cost of eﬀort (Black-Scholes),
(2) First-best, (3) Monopoly (one investor provides all ﬁnancing), (4) 100% Upfront ﬁnanc-
ing, (5) Syndicate Financing at date 1, (6) Fully Competitive ﬁnancing at dates 0 and 1,
(7) Monopoly Debt Financing (investor sets date 1 debt level instead of equity share), (8)
Syndicate Debt Financing at date 1 (initial investor sets debt level and syndicate sets pari-
passu debt level at date 1) and (9) Fully Competitive Debt Financing at dates 0 and 1. The
entrepreneur’s initial ownership share or contracted debt level, where relevant, is αM
0 and
K0 and eﬀort is x0. V is the minimum value necessary for investment at date 1. NPV is
the net present value at date 0, overall and for the entrepreneur (M) and initial investor
(C). Potential value is V0 = E0(V2) = 150. I0 and I1 denote ﬁxed investment costs, and σ is
standard deviation per period of Vt.E ﬀort parameters are θf (value-added) and θg (cost).
Increases in θf and θg represent increases in marginal returns and costs to eﬀort, respectively.
A. I0 =5 0 ,I 1 =5 0 , σ =0 .4, θf =1 .8, θg =0 .6
αM
0 K0 x0 VN P V M NPVC NPV
Black-Scholes - - ∞ 50.00 - - 50.03
First-best 1.00 - 2.54 55.35 37.90 - 37.90
Monopoly - - 1.18 70.84 3.43 13.58 17.01
Monopoly, No Staging 0.09 - 1.54 23.77 7.53 19.36 26.89
Syndicate, date 1 0.15 - 1.72 84.93 7.05 20.50 27.55
Competitive, dates 0, 1 0.46 - 2.22 69.10 36.02 0.00 36.02
Monopoly (Debt) - - 0.00 ∞ -1.00* -50.00* -51.00*
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt) - 109.31 2.27 124.60 17.80 3.92 21.72
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt) - 76.69 2.39 105.48 30.47 0.00 30.47
B. I0 =5 0 ,I 1 =5 0 , σ =0 .8, θf =1 .8, θg =0 .6
αM
0 K0 x0 VN P V M NPVC NPV
Black-Scholes - - ∞ 50.00 - - 52.55
First-best 1.00 - 2.52 55.37 41.48 - 41.48
Monopoly - - 1.17 71.14 2.59 19.45 22.05
Monopoly, No Staging 0.10 - 1.55 22.97 8.11 19.42 27.53
Syndicate, date 1 0.13 - 1.64 87.28 7.00 23.95 30.95
Competitive, dates 0, 1 0.48 - 2.21 68.83 39.63 0.00 39.63
Monopoly (Debt) - - 2.02 60.22 8.15 31.40 39.55
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt) - 355.84 2.08 143.77 16.15 7.66 23.80
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt) - 167.75 2.29 103.12 34.85 0.00 34.85
*indicates projects that yield, at best, negative net present value to at least one party. Such projects
will not be implemented.
43C. I0 =1 0 ,I 1 =9 0 , σ =0 .4, θf =1 .8, θg =0 .6
αM
0 K0 x0 VN P V M NPVC NPV
Black-Scholes - - ∞ 90.00 - - 52.19
First-best 1.00 - 2.50 96.56 40.98 - 40.98
Monopoly - - 1.35 117.44 2.16 24.55 26.71
Monopoly, No Staging 0.09 - 1.54 23.77 7.53 19.36 26.89
Syndicate, date 1 0.21 - 1.80 130.60 5.15 26.34 31.49
Competitive, dates 0, 1 0.82 - 2.42 110.15 39.44 0.00 39.44
Monopoly (Debt) - - 0.00 ∞ -1.00* -10.00* -11.00*
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt) - 91.18 2.15 154.65 10.39 18.52 28.92
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt) - 15.00 2.46 108.72 40.34 0.00 40.34
D. I0 =1 0 ,I 1 =9 0 , σ =0 .8, θf =1 .8, θg =0 .6
αM
0 K0 x0 VN P V M NPVC NPV
Black-Scholes - - ∞ 90.00 - - 64.09
First-best 1.00 - 2.46 96.63 54.44 - 54.44
Monopoly - - 1.18 121.54 1.59 37.29 38.87
Monopoly, No Staging 0.10 - 1.55 22.97 8.11 19.42 27.53
Syndicate, date 1 0.15 - 1.63 138.44 5.35 40.20 45.55
Competitive, dates 0, 1 0.86 - 2.40 109.85 53.59 0.00 53.59
Monopoly (Debt) - - 1.97 106.86 6.87 45.87 52.74
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt) - 422.88 1.94 204.69 9.61 29.09 38.71
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt) - 28.29 2.42 115.86 53.54 0.00 53.54
*indicates projects that yield, at best, negative net present value to at least one party. Such projects
will not be implemented.
44E. I0 =1 0 ,I 1 =9 0 , σ =0 .4, θf =0 .6, θg =0 .6
αM
0 K0 x0 VN P V M NPVC NPV
Black-Scholes - - ∞ 90.00 - - 52.19
First-best 1.00 - 3.88 123.11 10.98 - 10.98
Monopoly - - 2.15 187.29 -0.94* -3.19* -4.13*
Monopoly, No Staging 0.22 - 2.72 23.14 10.85 -23.55* -12.70*
Syndicate, date 1 0.51 - 3.05 178.85 1.98 -0.43* 1.55
Competitive, dates 0, 1 0.51 - 3.05 178.85 1.98 - 1.55
Monopoly (Debt) - - 0.00 ∞ -1.00* -10.00* -11.00*
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt) - 47.39 3.30 177.18 3.14 1.17 4.31
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt) - 30.34 3.54 158.73 7.53 0.00 7.53
F. I0 =1 0 ,I 1 =9 0 , σ =0 .8, θf =0 .6, θg =0 .6
αM
0 K0 x0 VN P V M NPVC NPV
Black-Scholes - - ∞ 90.00 - - 64.09
First-best 1.00 - 3.87 123.15 27.72 - 27.72
Monopoly - - 1.88 200.74 0.29 7.59 7.88
Monopoly, No Staging 0.21 - 2.72 23.29 11.29 -22.48* -11.19*
Syndicate, date 1 0.35 - 2.80 197.18 5.01 12.50 17.50
Competitive, dates 0, 1 0.79 - 3.63 158.20 24.95 0.00 24.95
Monopoly (Debt) - - 0.00 ∞ -1.00* -10.00* -11.00*
Syndicate, date 1 (Debt) - 218.35 3.10 229.72 6.51 10.94 17.45
Competitive, dates 0, 1 (Debt) - 41.06 3.71 153.95 26.15 0.00 26.15
*indicates projects that yield, at best, negative net present value to at least one party. Such projects
will not be implemented.
45Figure 1: Eﬀort functions. As eﬀort increases, the return to eﬀort approaches 1 (100% of
potential value). The marginal cost of eﬀort is positive and increasing. The return and cost
curves depend on parameters θf and θg, which are varied here between 0.2 and 2.2.
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46Figure 2: Date-1 Net present values are plotted against V1, the date-1 realization of maximum
potential value. Potential value is V0 = E0(V2)=1 5 0 . The lognormal probability density
is plotted for a standard deviation of 0.4. Date-1 investment is I1 =5 0 . With no costs of
eﬀort, NPV1 = V1 − I1.W h e ne ﬀort is costly, the level and slope of NPV1 decline because
of reduced eﬀo r ta td a t e0( t h eo p t i m a le ﬀort x 
0 is too low to attain maximum potential
value). The strike value V 1, which incorporates the cost of date-1 eﬀort, increases from I1
to I1 + g(x 
1)=7 0 .84.

































47F i g u r e3 :N e tP r e s e n tV a l u ea td a t e0i nt h eﬁrst-best scenario. NPV is shown across a
range of standard deviation (σ ∈ [0.1,1.2])a n de ﬀort return (θf/θg ∈ [1/11,11]) parameters.
The dark surface presents date-0 and date-1 investment levels I0 = I1 =5 0while the light
surface presents I0 =1 0 ,I 1 =9 0 .P o t e n t i a l v a l u e i s V0 = E0(V2) = 150.
48Figure 4: A typical plot of ownership shares at date 1 for the entrepreneur (M) and venture
capitalist (C) in the monopoly case in where one venture capitalist provides all stage-0 and
stage-1 ﬁnancing. Two curves are shown for the venture capitalist. The ﬁrst αC
MAX is the
maximum share at which the entrepreneur will still participate. The second αC
FOC is the
optimal share, at which the entrepreneur is provided with positive NPV and the incentive
for continued eﬀort. The optimal share is lower than the maximum share in the region
where V1 exceeds the strike value V1. The entrepreneur’s minority share αM declines as V1
increases.

























49Figure 5: Net Present Value at date 0, plotted for the Monopoly and Monopoly, No Staging
ﬁnancing scenarios. NPV is shown across a range of standard deviation (σ ∈ [0.1,1.2])
and eﬀort return (θf/θg ∈ [1/11,11]) parameters. The dark surface presents non-staged
NPVs while the light surface presents staged NPVs. Figure 5 assumes date-0 and date-1
investment levels I0 = I1 =5 0and potential value of V0 = E0(V2)=1 5 0 .
50Figure 6: Net Present Value at date 0, plotted for the Monopoly and Monopoly, No Staging
ﬁnancing scenarios. NPV is shown across a range of standard deviation (σ ∈ [0.1,1.2])
and eﬀort return (θf/θg ∈ [1/11,11]) parameters. The dark surface presents non-staged
NPVs while the light surface presents staged NPVs. Figure 6 assumes date-0 and date-1
investment levels I0 =1 0 ,I 1 =9 0and potential value of V0 = E0(V2)=1 5 0 .
51Figure 7: A typical plot of ownership shares at date 1 for the entrepreneur (M), initial venture
capitalist (C) and syndicate of new investors (S) for the syndicate case. The syndicate
provides ﬁnancing on competitive terms (NPV =0 ) whenever V1 exceeds the strike value
V1, which is higher than in the monopoly case shown in Figure 4. The syndicate’s optimal
share αS
FOC is lower than the maximum share αS
MAX at which the entrepreneur would still
participate. The constrained share αS declines as V1 increases, while the ownership shares
held by the entrepreneur and incumbent venture capitalist increase with V1.





























52Figure 8: A typical plot of ownership shares at date 1 for the entrepreneur (M), initial
syndicate (S1) and a second syndicate of new investors (S2) for the wholly competitive case.
The second syndicate provides date 1 ﬁnancing on competitive terms (NPV =0 ) whenever
V1 exceeds the strike value V1, which is lower than in both the syndicate and monopoly cases
shown previously. The constrained share αS2 declines as V1 increases, while the ownership
shares held by the entrepreneur and incumbent investors increase with V1.T h e s h a r e h e l d
by the entrepreneur (αM) is more in parity with incumbent investors’ shares, compared with
the syndicate case.





























53Figure 9: Net Present Value Loss at date 0, relative to ﬁrst best, expressed as a percentage
of total required investment. Potential value is V0 = E0(V2)=1 5 0 .T h ev a l u el o s sd e p e n d s
on the ratio of the return and cost of eﬀort parameters, θf/θg.L o s tNPV is plotted for the
monopoly, syndicate, and fully competitive cases, and also for the monopoly case without
staging, in which the monopolist provides upfront ﬁnancing and sets αC
0 at time 0. Figure 9
presents 4 assumptions on date-0 and date-1 investments and lognormal standard deviation.
In 9a and 9b, I0 = I1 =5 0 .I n 9 c a n d 9 d , I0 =1 0and I1 =9 0 .I n 9 a a n d 9 c , σ =0 .4 while
in 9b and 9d, σ =0 .8.
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54Figure 10: Net Present Value Loss at date 0, relative to ﬁrst best, expressed as a percentage
of total required investment. Potential value is V0 = E0(V2)=2 0 0 .T h ev a l u el o s sd e p e n d s
on the ratio of the return and cost of eﬀort parameters, θf/θg.L o s tNPV is plotted for the
monopoly, syndicate, and fully competitive cases, and also for the monopoly case without
staging, in which the monopolist provides upfront ﬁnancing and sets αC
0 at time 0. Figure 10
presents 4 assumptions on date-0 and date-1 investments and lognormal standard deviation.
In 10a and 10b, I0 = I1 =5 0 . In 10c and 10d, I0 =1 0and I1 =9 0 . In 10a and 10c, σ =0 .4
while in 10b and 10d, σ =0 .8.
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